Rethinking Broadband Internet Access by Spulber, Daniel F & Yoo, Christopher S.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
6-16-2008 
Rethinking Broadband Internet Access 
Daniel F. Spulber 
Northwestern University 
Christopher S. Yoo 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, Computer Law 
Commons, Digital Communications and Networking Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Policy 
Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the Science and 
Technology Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Spulber, Daniel F. and Yoo, Christopher S., "Rethinking Broadband Internet Access" (2008). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 228. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/228 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Rethinking Broadband Internet Access 
Daniel F. Spulber* & Christopher S. Yoo**
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1 
I. Overview of the Regulation of Access to Broadband Networks .............................................. 7 
A. The Early Regulation of Cable Modem Systems................................................................ 9 
B. The Early Regulation of Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) ................................................ 13 
C. The Current Regulatory Status of Last-Mile Broadband Networks ................................. 21 
II. The Applicability of the Traditional Rationales for Regulating Telecommunications to 
Last-Mile Broadband Networks.............................................................................................. 22 
A. Natural Monopoly............................................................................................................. 23 
B. Network Economic Effects ............................................................................................... 33 
C. Vertical Exclusion............................................................................................................. 38 
D. Managed Competition....................................................................................................... 50 
III. Evaluating the Different Types of Access to Broadband Networks ....................................... 61 
A. Network Basics ................................................................................................................. 62 
B. Applying the Framework to Last-Mile Broadband Networks .......................................... 68 
1. Retail Access............................................................................................................... 68 
2. Wholesale Access ....................................................................................................... 71 
3. Interconnection Access ............................................................................................... 75 
4. Platform Access .......................................................................................................... 78 
5. Unbundled Access ...................................................................................................... 86 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 90 
INTRODUCTION 
 A series of technological and theoretical forces are currently effecting a fundamental 
transformation of the Internet.  The widescale deployment of broadband technologies now allows 
end users to enjoy unprecedented speeds.  The initial analog technology employed dial-up 
modems to modulate data communications into audible sounds that could be transmitted via 
conventional telephone lines, which had a maximum theoretical speed of 56 kilobits per second 
(kbps).  Current broadband platforms, such as cable modem systems, digital subscriber lines 
(DSL), wireless technologies, and fiber-based transmission such as Verizon’s FiOS service, 
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employ digital technologies capable of delivering speeds that are up to 500 times faster.  The 
increase in bandwidth has caused the relatively simple applications that dominated the 
narrowband Internet, such as e-mail and web browsing, to give way to more sophisticated and 
bandwidth-intensive multimedia applications, including streaming video, music and movie 
downloads, and virtual worlds (such as World of Warcraft and Second Life).   
 At the same time, competition in Internet service has increased dramatically.  Cable 
modem service, which was the early leader in the broadband industry, has faced increasing 
competition from DSL and fiber-based services provided by local telephone companies.  Even 
more dramatic has been the rise of wireless broadband technologies, which grew from having no 
subscribers as of the end of 2004 to having 21.9 million subscribers by the end of 2006, which 
represents over 25% of the market for high-speed lines.1  Published reports suggest that wireless 
broadband providers continued to add subscribers at a brisk pace since that time, reaching as 
many as 45 million subscribers by September 2007.2  The planned 2011 redeployment of 
spectrum previously dedicated to broadcast television to wireless Internet services promises to 
intensify last-mile broadband competition still further. 
 Other forces are more theoretical than technological.  Scholars have increasingly 
explored the conceptual limits of the theories usually invoked to justify the regulation of 
telecommunications networks and underscored the extent to which they presume that a single 
firm dominates the provision of last-mile services.  Furthermore, the basic paradigm for 
regulating network industries has shifted from traditional rate regulation, in which regulators 
                                                 
1 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Indus. Analysis & Tech. Div., Wireline Competition Bureau, High-Speed 
Services for Internet Access:  Status as of December 31, 2006, at tbl.2 (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-277784A1.pdf [hereinafter High-Speed Services Dec. 2006 
Report]. 
2 See Jom Ross, Casting the Mobile Net:  The Net Goes Mobile, at 
http://www.ctia.org/content/index.cfm/AID/11203. 
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dictate the terms under which network owners sell outputs to consumers, to a new approach 
known as access regulation, under which regulators control the terms under which network 
owners must lease key inputs to competitors.  This shift is perhaps best exemplified by the 
landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires telephone companies providing local 
service when the statute was enacted (which the statute calls “incumbent local exchange carriers” 
or ILECs) to provide competitors with access to key elements of their networks.3  Access 
regulation has also emerged as a dominant feature in the regulation of a wide range of other 
network facilities, including cable television systems, utility poles, natural gas pipelines, and 
electric power distribution grids.4
 Unfortunately, policymakers have struggled to determine the impact of these forces on 
the regulation of broadband technologies.  When asked to address the proper regulatory 
classification for broadband between 1998 and 2002, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) temporized and repeatedly declined to resolve the issue.5  The FCC initial 2002 attempt to 
address the issue in earnest prompted three additional years of litigation that ultimately had to be 
resolved by the Supreme Court, and even then the FCC left open the precise nature of the 
                                                 
3 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2004).  The statute requires that the accessed elements be “necessary” and that “the 
failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier 
seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer.”  Id. § 251(d)(2)(A) & (B).  For a review of the 
regulatory antecedents to § 251(c)(3), see Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks:  Economic 
and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 960-65, 1005-09 (2003). 
4 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex Systems:  A 
Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2005) (citing sources). 
5 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 348-49, 353-56 & nn.5-6 (2002) 
(Thomas, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recounting numerous examples between 
1998 and 2002 in which the FCC declined to take a position on the proper regulatory classification for broadband 
services and criticizing the FCC for its failure to address the issue). 
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regulatory requirements might be imposed.6  A subsequent 2005 FCC decision did not 
completely resolve the issue,7 which is now the subject to an ongoing Notice of Inquiry.8   
 As a result, mandating access to last-mile broadband systems emerged as an issue in each 
of the mega-mergers that swept through cable and telecommunications industries between 1999 
and 2007.9  Requests to mandate access to broadband networks also drew congressional 
attention, playing a key role during the consideration of major telecommunications reform 
legislation in 2006.10  On the academic side, scholars have advocated requiring 
                                                 
6 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4843-48 ¶¶ 83-95 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory 
Ruling & NPRM], aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
7 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order 
and Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14856 ¶ 2 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Access 
Order]. 
8 Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894 (2007). 
9 Regulatory authorities rejected requests to mandate access to last-mile broadband networks as a condition 
for approval of major cable mergers, including the AT&T’s acquisition of TCI and MediaOne, AT&T’s subsequent 
spinoff of those assets to Comcast, and the sales in conjunction with the resolution of the Adelphia bankruptcy.  See 
Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses:  Adelphia Communications 
Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), 
Assignees et al., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203, 8296-99 ¶¶ 217-223 (2006) [hereinafter 
Adelphia Order]; Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses from Comcast Corp. and AT&T 
Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 23246, 23299-301 
¶¶ 135-137 (2002) [hereinafter Comcast-AT&T Order]; Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses 
and Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9872-73 ¶ 127 (2000) [hereinafter AT&T-MediaOne Order]; Applications for 
Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., 
Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, 3205-08 ¶¶ 92-96 
(1999) [hereinafter AT&T-TCI Order].  The only time that the FCC imposed any access requirements was during 
AOL’s acquisition of Time Warner.  See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 
214 Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc., 
Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6568-69 ¶¶ 57-58 (2001) [hereinafter AOL-Time 
Warner Order]; America Online, Inc., No. C-3989, slip op. at 2, 6-9, 11-17 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2000) (Decision and 
Order), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf; 
 Regulatory authorities also entertained requests to mandate access to last-mile broadband systems when 
evaluating major mergers in the telecommunications industry, including SBC-AT&T, Verizon-MCI, and AT&T-
BellSouth.  See AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5727-31 ¶¶ 116-120, 5742-46 ¶¶ 151-153 (2007) [hereinafter AT&T-BellSouth Order]; 
Verizon Communications, Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, 18507-09 ¶¶ 139-142 (2005) [hereinafter Verizon-MCI Order]; SBC 
Communications, Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18290, 18365-68 ¶¶ 140-143 (2005) [hereinafter SBC-AT&T Order]. 
10 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1859-60 
(2006). 
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nondiscriminatory access to last-mile broadband networks first under the rubric of “open access 
to cable modem systems”11 and more recently as part of the debates over “network neutrality.”12  
As support for their proposals, these advocates have based their arguments two regulatory 
precedents (commonly known as the Carterfone13 and the Computer Inquiries14) that imposed 
nondiscriminatory access requirements on the local telephone networks then monopolized by 
AT&T.15
 Unfortunately, the debate over these issues has failed to take into account the extent to 
which the transformative forces discussed above changes the fundamental analysis.  As an initial 
matter, access proponents have proposed extending narrowband regulatory regimes to broadband 
without analyzing whether the technological and economic differences that characterize the 
broadband environment undercut the applicability of the rationales traditionally invoked to 
justify regulation of telecommunications networks.  In addition, the existing commentary has 
also largely failed to incorporate the insights into the practical and theoretical limits of the tools 
used to implement access that regulators have amassed through their experience overseeing 
access mandates. 
 Equally importantly, existing scholarship has treated access to broadband networks as a 
unitary phenomenon by either regarding the network to which access is sought as a black box 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:  Preserving the Architecture of the 
Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to 
Broadband Networks: A Case Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631 (2001). 
12 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
141 (2003); Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 74-84 (2003). 
13 See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Services, Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). 
14 See Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 
FED. COMM. L.J. 167 (2003) (providing an overview of the Computer Inquiries). 
15 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 11, at 970 (citing Carterfone); Weiser, supra note 12, at 65-68, 80-84 
(citing the Computer Inquiries and Carterfone); Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law?  Anti-
Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 33 (2006) (citing the Computer 
Inquiries and Carterfone). 
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without analyzing how the network is configured by discussing different approaches to 
determining the cost of individual network elements, which effectively treats the individual 
network elements being accessed as if they existed in isolation.  Both approaches fail to reflect 
that networks are complex systems whose behavior can only be understood after considering 
particular way that the various network elements are configured.  Indeed, one of the most 
distinctive characteristics of networks is their ability to reroute traffic along alternate pathways to 
compensate for changes in traffic flow.  Although this process of accommodation and redirection 
can alleviate in whole or in part the impact of any unanticipated changes in volume, to the extent 
that other areas of the network were already at or near saturation, it can also transfer congestion 
and the accompanying degradation in network performance to other portions of the network 
discontinuous with the point of disruption in ways that can be quite unpredictable unless one 
analyzes the configuration of the entire network, viewed in light of the magnitude and variability 
of the traffic flowing through it at any given time.  In short, for networks, the whole exceeds the 
sum of the parts and can only be understood if analyzed as an integrated system in light of an 
overarching theory of how different network components interact with one another. 
 This Article seeks to address both of these shortcomings.  Part I reviews the manner in 
which the leading last-mile broadband technologies have been regulated.  Part II describes the 
theories invoked to justify mandating access to telecommunications in the past—including 
natural monopoly, network economic effects, vertical exclusion, and managed competition—and 
evaluates their applicability to last-mile broadband networks.  It concludes that each of these 
previous theories have little significance to an industry characterized by vibrant intermodal 
competition, rapid customer growth, and dynamic technological change.  Part III employs a five-
part conceptual framework that we have developed based on a branch of mathematics known as 
6 
graph theory to analyze the impact of various types of access in a more systematic manner.  This 
framework illustrates the extent to which mandating different types of access to last-mile 
broadband networks, showing how the regulations proposed by proponents of open access to 
cable modem systems and network neutrality would adversely affect network owners’ ability to 
manage their networks and to respond to consumer preferences as well as how the incentives of 
both incumbents and new entrants to invest in deploying the new network capacity that 
represents the best long-run solution to these problems.   
I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF ACCESS TO BROADBAND NETWORKS 
 Until 2004, broadband, which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has 
defined broadband as the capability of providing speeds of at least 200 kbps in both directions,16 
was dominated by two technologies.  Cable modem service was the early industry leader, 
deploying nearly one million lines by 1999, and peaking at 77% of the broadband market at the 
end of 2003.  Since that time, DSL has emerged as a vibrant competitor, capturing 36% of the 
market and reducing cable modem’s share to 53% by the end of 2006.  Given that DSL’s growth 
rate of 33% exceeded cable modem’s growth rate of 21%, this gap is likely to narrow still further 
in the future.17
 The deployment of two additional technologies promises to alter the competitive 
landscape still further.  Verizon in the process of deploying its fiber-optic based FiOS network, 
committing to invest $23 billion between 2004 and 2010, at which point FiOS should be 
                                                 
16 Inquiry Considering the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a 
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2406 ¶ 20 (1999) [hereinafter First Section 706 
Report]. 
17 High-Speed Services Dec. 2006 Report, supra note 1, tbl.2. 
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available in half of its service area.18  In addition, mobile wireless providers are in the process of 
upgrading their networks to support Internet applications.  These services have grown sharply 
since the beginning of 2005, capturing 7% of the broadband market.  The impact of mobile 
wireless becomes all the more striking if one considers the other category of high-speed services 
tracked by the FCC, i.e., “high-speed lines,” defined to be services that provide at least 200 kbps 
in at least one direction.  Between their introduction at the beginning of 2005 and the end of 
2006, mobile wireless providers had captured nearly 27% of the market for high-speed lines, 
which reduced the shares of cable modem services and DSL to 39% and 30% respectively.19  
Competition is also beginning to emerge from unlicensed wireless technologies, such as WiFi 
and WiMax.  The planned auction of additional spectrum in the 700 MHz range for wireless 
Internet services promises to further diversify the market structure in the future.20
 The principal question facing regulatory authorities was determining how last-mile 
broadband services fit into the regulatory categories created by our nation’s communications 
laws.  “Telecommunications carriers” are governed by Title II of the Communications Act of 
1934 and subject to a wide range of common carriage and nondiscriminatory access 
requirements.21  Providers of “cable service” are governed by Title VI, which was enacted in 
                                                 
18 Verizon Commc’ns Inc., All About Verizon FiOS – Fact Sheet, at http://newscenter.verizon.com/kit/fios-
symmetrical-internet-service/all-about-fios.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
19 High-Speed Services Dec. 2006 Report, supra note 1, tbls. 1, 2. 
20 Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762, and 777-792 MHz Bands, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 
15289 (2007). 
21 The statute defines “telecommunications” as “the transmission, between or among points specified by the 
user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and 
received.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(43).  “Telecommunications service” is “the offering of telecommunications for a fee 
directly to the public . . . regardless of the facilities used.”  Id. § 153(46).  “Telecommunications carriers” are 
“provider[s] of telecommunications services.”  Id. § 153(44).  Telecommunications carriers must satisfy every 
reasonable request for service on terms that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 
202, 205.  They are also subject to the access requirements created by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  See 47 
U.S.C. § 251. 
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1984 and created a different set of access requirements.22  “Information services” fall under Title 
I, which are not subject to any statutory access requirements, but remain subject to any access 
requirements that the FCC chooses to impose under its general regulatory authority.23   
A. The Early Regulation of Cable Modem Systems 
 Cable modem systems provide service through the network of coaxial cables originally 
designed for cable television.  The thickness of the coaxial cable allows some cable modem 
providers to offer faster speeds than DSL.  The initial cable modem architecture, designed 
around DOCSIS 1.0, supported maximum theoretical speeds of 27 megabits per second (Mbps) 
downstream and 10 Mbps upstream,24 with the actual downloads speeds reaching 6 Mbps.25  The 
                                                 
22 Federal law defines “cable service” as “(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video 
programming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the 
selection or use of such video programming or other programming service.”  47 U.S.C. § 522(6).  “Video 
programming” is defined as “programming provided by, or generally considered comparable to programming 
provided by, a television broadcast station.”  Id. § 522(20).  “Other programming service” is defined as “information 
that a cable operator makes available to all subscribers generally.”  Id. § 522(14).  A “cable system” is generally 
defined to be “a facility . . . designed to provide cable service which includes video programming and which is 
provided to multiple subscribers within a community.”  Id. § 522(7).  A “cable operator” is “any person or group of 
persons (A) who provides cable service over a cable system and directly or through one or more affiliates owns a 
significant interest in such cable system, or (B) who otherwise controls or is responsible for, through any 
arrangement, the management and operation of such a cable system.”  Id. § 522(5).  Cable operators are not 
regulated as common carriers, id. § 541(c), but are subject to a wide range of other access requirements.  See id. 
§§ 531 (access for public, educational, and governmental use), 532 (leased access), 534 (must carry for commercial 
broadcasters), 535 (must carry for noncommercial broadcasters). 
23 An “information service” is “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, 
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic 
publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a 
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.”  Id. § 153(20).  “Information-
service providers . . . are not subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II, thought he Commission 
has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate 
interstate and foreign communications.”  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
976 (2005); accord id. at 996 (noting that the FCC “remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-
based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction”), 1002 (noting the FCC’s authority to require cable companies to 
provide access to independent ISPs). 
24 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in 
a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2917-18 ¶ 21 (2002). 
25 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in 
a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of 
9 
cable industry is just beginning its shift to DOCSIS 3.0, which can support download speeds of 
up to 160 Mbps and upload speeds of up to 120 Mbps.26
 The architecture of cable modem systems requires that the same infrastructure be shared 
with multiple users, which renders cable modem systems susceptible to congestion and which 
limits cable modem providers’ ability to guarantee particular levels of network performance.  
Cable networks do require some reconfiguration before they can support broadband service.  The 
network must be transformed from the typical tree-and-branch configuration associated with 
one-way television transmission into a ring or star-type configuration needed for data 
transmission, and the distance between certain facilities and the end user must be reduced.  This 
is usually accomplished through the deployment of a ring of neighborhood nodes connected via 
optical fiber to their main offices (known as headends).  Cable operators must also improve 
system quality to reduce signal leakage.  In order to convert their networks to two-way service, 
cable modem providers must install amplifiers and optical lasers in both directions.  They must 
also deploy cable modem termination systems (CMTS) to separate the data stream from the other 
traffic as well as establish the routers and switches to manage the data traffic emerging from the 
CMTS.27  An early FCC report placed the cost of these upgrades at between $800 and $1000 per 
subscriber.28  
 Because cable modems arose from a technology subject to joint municipal-federal 
oversight, some ambiguity existed as to the proper division of regulatory jurisdiction.  On 
                                                                                                                                                             
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Fourth Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 20540, 20554 (2004) [hereinafter Fourth Section 706 
Report]. 
26 See CableLabs, DOCSIS—Project Primer, at http://www.cablemodem.com/primer/ (last visited Mar. 9, 
2008). 
27 Inquiry Considering the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a 
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 20913, 20928-29 ¶¶ 29-31 (1999) [hereinafter 
Second Section 706 Report]. 
28 See First Section 706 Report, supra note 16, at 2431 chart 2. 
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multiple different occasions between 1998 and 2002, the FCC declined to decide which 
regulatory classification that should apply to cable modem service, let alone decide the scope of 
any access obligations that might apply,29 with its reluctance to do so drawing a rebuke from two 
members of the Supreme Court.30  In the absence of a clear assertion of federal authority, several 
municipal regulators attempted to exercise jurisdiction over cable modem systems, either by 
mandating access to those systems by municipal ordinance31 or as a condition for the transfer of 
licenses needed to complete a cable merger.32  Municipal regulation was soon cut short by a 
series of judicial decisions holding that municipal authorities lacked the jurisdiction to compel 
multiple ISP access.33
 The fact that the FCC also had to provide regulatory approval for these mergers forced 
the FCC to confront requests for mandatory access cable modem systems as well.  In 1999 and 
2000, the FCC declined to require AT&T to provide independent ISPs with nondiscriminatory 
access to its cable modem systems as a condition of its acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne.34  In 
2001, however, the Federal Trade Commission and the FCC imposed just such requirement 
                                                 
29 See Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Amendment of the 
Commission’s Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 6795 ¶ 34 (1998); Federal-State 
Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11535 n.140 (1998); Brief of the Federal 
Communications Commission as Amicus Curiae at 19-26, AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 
2000) (No. 99-35609) (filed Aug. 17, 1999); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Communications Commission at 
15-16, 18, MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2001) (filed Aug. 9, 2000); 
AT&T-MediaOne Order, supra note 9, at 9872 ¶ 126; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over 
Cable and Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 19287, 19293-28 ¶¶ 15-24 (2000); Petition for Certiorari 
at 15 n.4, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-843) (filed Nov. 22, 
2000); Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 30, Gulf Power (No. 00-843) (filed Apr. 6, 2001). 
30 Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 353-56 (Thomas, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
31 See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 686-87 (S.D. 
Fla. 2000). 
32 See MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 360; Portland, 216 F.3d at 875. 
33 See MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 363-64; Portland, 216 F.3d at 878-79. 
34 See AT&T-MediaOne Order, supra note 9, at 9872-73 ¶ 127; AT&T-TCI Order, supra note 9, at 3205-08 
¶¶ 92-96. 
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when approving America Online’s acquisition of Time Warner.35  When the issue arose again in 
2002 during regulatory clearance of Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable assets, the FCC 
returned to its initial position and declined to make its approval of their merger conditional on 
the merged company’s willingness to provide multiple ISP access.36   
 In the midst of the foregoing series of merger reviews, the FCC initiated a notice of 
inquiry seeking comment on, among other things, whether it should impose access requirements 
on cable modem systems.37  The FCC added further guidance in 2002 in its Cable Modem 
Declaratory Ruling, in which it determined that cable modem service is an interstate 
“information service” that was exempt from both the common carriage regime established under 
Title II to govern telecommunications services and from the regulatory regime established by 
Title VI to govern cable television services.38  In addition, the FCC declined to impose the 
tariffing and unbundling requirements created by the Computer Inquiries to cable modem 
service, noting that the agency previously “has applied these obligations only to traditional 
wireline services and facilities, and has never applied them to information services provided over 
cable facilities.”39  These aspects of the FCC’s decision were sustained by the Supreme Court’s 
2005 decision in National Cable and Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.40
 Declaring that cable modem systems constituted information services did not resolve 
exactly how cable modem systems would be regulated.  On the contrary, the FCC specifically 
                                                 
35 America Online, Inc., No. C-3989, slip op. at 2, 6-9, 11-17 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2000) (Decision and Order), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf; AOL-Time Warner Order, supra note 9, at 6568-69 ¶¶ 57-58.  
36 Comcast-AT&T Order, supra note 9, at 23299-301 ¶¶ 135-137.   
37 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 
15 F.C.C.R. 19287 (2000). 
38 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4820-39 ¶¶ 34-69 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory 
Ruling & NPRM]. 
39 Id. at 4825 ¶ 44; accord id. at 4825 ¶ 43. 
40 545 U.S. 967, 1001 (2005). 
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sought comment on what, if any, access requirements it shod impose on cable modem service.41  
Also, concerned that a patchwork of inconsistent state and local regulation could discourage 
investment and innovation, the FCC sought comment on whether it should preempt state 
regulation, including access requirements.42  Until the agency addresses the issue directly, the 
possibility remains that state and local authorities will exercise concurrent jurisdiction over cable 
modem service that leaves them free to mandate access.43  That said, because services classified 
as information services in the past had been subject to minimal regulatory requirements, 
classifying cable modem service as an information service was regarded by many as a signal that 
the FCC was unlikely to mandate multiple ISP access.44  The fact that the FCC had preempted 
state regulation in the Computer Inquiries also suggested that that the FCC was likely to do the 
same with respect to cable modem services.45
B. The Early Regulation of Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) 
 The other principal technology for providing last-mile broadband Internet service is 
known as digital subscriber lines (DSL), which was first deployed in 1996.  DSL takes advantage 
of the fact that conventional voice communications only occupy the lower transmission 
frequencies (typically those ranging from 300 to 3400 Hz).  It is thus possible to use the higher 
frequencies (i.e., those above 20 kHz) to convey data communications through the same 
                                                 
41 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, supra note 38, at 4840-41 ¶ 74, 4843-47 ¶¶ 80-93, 4849 
¶ 100. 
42 Id. at 4848 ¶¶ 97-100. 
43 Cal. ISP Ass’n v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., Decision 03-07-032, 2003 WL 21704389 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 
July 10, 2003) (affirming Assign Commissioner’s and Administrative Law Judge’s ruling that the state regulatory 
authorities had concurrent jurisdiction over cable modem service). 
44 Yochai J. Dreazen, FCC Ruling Frees Cable-TV Firms from Sharing Wires, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at 
B2. 
45 Chérie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation on the Horizon: Are Regulators Poised to Address the 
Status pf IP Telephony?, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 19, 38 (2003); John T. Nakahata, Regulating Information 
Platforms:  The Challenge of Rewriting Communications Regulation from the Bottom Up, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 95, 118 (2002). 
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telephone line without interfering with voice communications.  The most common form of DSL 
is asymmetric DSL (ADSL), which typically supports download speeds of up to 3 Mbps and 
uploads speeds of up to 768 kbps.46  More recent versions of ADSL support download speeds of 
up to 24 Mbps.47  AT&T and other local telephone companies are in the process of deploying 
faster technologies, such as very high-data-rate digital subscriber lines (VDSL), capable of 
providing speeds of up to 50 Mbps. 
 Several technical changes must be made before a local telephone network can be used for 
DSL.  First, local telephone lines must be “conditioned” by removing devices destined to 
improve the quality of voice calls (such as bridge taps, low-pass filters, and range extenders) that 
interfere with the provision of DSL service.  In addition, special equipment known as a digital 
subscriber line access multiplexer (DSLAM) must be installed to separate voice traffic from data 
traffic.  In addition, the local telephone company must establish a data network, including routers 
and switches, to manage the traffic after it emerges from the DSLAM.48  Early estimates place 
the cost of these upgrades at $400 to $600 per subscriber.49
 The fact that resistance increases with the length of the copper wire places a natural limit 
on the range of DSL.  For ADSL, customers must be located no farther than twelve to eighteen 
thousand feet from the DSLAM.  For VDSL, customers must be located no more than four 
thousand feet from the DSLAM.  Local telephone companies can extend the range of DSL by 
deploying a technology known as digital loop carriers (DLCs).  Instead of using an all-copper 
loop to connect the central office and the customer’s premises, DLC systems deploy DSLAMs in 
                                                 
46 See Fourth Section 706 Report, supra note 25, at 20556. 
47 See DSL Forum, About ADSL, available at http://www.dslforum.org/learndsl/adslfaq.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2008). 
48 See Second Section 706 Report, supra note 27, at 20930 ¶ 35. 
49 First Section 706 Report, supra note 16, at 2431 chart 2. 
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satellite facilities known as remote terminals, which connected to the local telephone company’s 
central office via optical fiber.  Under this architecture, only the distance between the remote 
terminal and the customer’s premises are connected through a copper subloop.  By shortening 
the length of the copper wire providing the final connections to end users, DLC architectures also 
increase the effective range of DSL, although it greatly increases the costs of deployment.  The 
limited space available in remote terminals can also make mandating access to those terminals 
quite problematic. 
 In stark contrast to the tentativeness of the FCC’s regulatory approach to cable modems, 
the agency did not hesitate to assert jurisdiction over DSL.  From the beginning, the FCC 
concluded that DSL was analogous to private-line services offering dedicated connections 
providing direct access to long distance providers.  So long as interstate traffic represented more 
than ten per cent of the total traffic, DSL was properly tariffed at the federal level and not at the 
state level.50  The net result was that DSL was typically offered as a tariffed service.51   
 The FCC did struggle over whether the Telecommunications Act of 1996 applied to the 
Internet, which Congress all but ignored when enacting the legislation.52  The major access 
provisions of the 1996 Act applied only to incumbent local telephone companies that provided 
“telephone exchange service,” which is the use of the local telephone network to reach other 
local customers, or “exchange access,” which is the use of the local telephone network to 
                                                 
50 GTE Telephone Operating Cos., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 22466, 22480 ¶ 25, 22481 
¶ 27 (1998) [hereinafter GTE DSL Order]. 
51 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Second Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 7105, 
7120 ¶ 27 (1999) (“noting that “digital subscriber line (DSL) services are generally offered as tariffed 
telecommunications services.”). 
52 See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 857 (1997) (“The major components of the [Telecommunications 
Act of 1996] have nothing to do with the Internet.”); John D. Podesta, Unplanned Obsolescence: The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Meets the Internet, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093, 1109 (1996) (“[W]ith the rather 
major exception of censorship, Congress simply legislated as if the Net were not there.”). 
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connect to long distance providers to reach long distance customers.53  The FCC’s Advanced 
Services Order concluded that DSL service constituted either telephone exchange service or 
exchange access without resolving into which category DSL service fell and thus was subject to 
the 1996 Act’s resale, interconnection, unbundled access, and collocation mandates.  The order 
also initiated a rulemaking seeking comment on precisely how to apply these resale, unbundling, 
and collocation requirements and proposing that DSL be allowed to avoid the restrictions 
imposed incumbent local telephone companies so long as they provide service through a separate 
subsidiary.54  After US West sought judicial review of the Advanced Service Order, the FCC 
moved to remand the matter voluntarily so that it could consider the arguments raised US West’s 
brief.55  On remand, the FCC reaffirmed its conclusion that DSL represented either telephone 
exchange service or exchange access.56  On judicial review, the D.C. Circuit vacated and 
remanded the order.  Agency and judicial precedent dictated that telephone exchange service and 
exchange access constituted exclusive categories that occupy the entire field and thus that traffic 
either had to be classified as one or the other.  The FCC’s failure to resolve into which category 
DSL properly fell represented a want of reasoned decisionmaking sufficient to justify 
invalidating the agency’s action.57
 In addition, the FCC had to address precisely which network elements needed were 
subject the 1996 Act’s provisions mandating access to unbundled network elements (UNE).58  
Initially, the agency adopted a permissive, if somewhat grudging, stance.  Because the statute by 
                                                 
53 47 U.S.C. § 251. 
54 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 24012, 24034-35 ¶¶ 46-47 (1998).  
55 US West Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1410 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 1999) (unpublished disposition 
available at 1999 WL 728555). 
56 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Order on Remand, 
15 F.C.C.R. 385 (1999).  
57 WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690, 695-96 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
58 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). 
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its own terms applies only to elements used in telephone exchange service and exchange access, 
the initial order implementing the 1996 Act declined to subject packet switches to UNE access 
requirements and ruled that collocation did not extend to equipment used to provide enhanced 
services, although it included multifunction equipment supporting both conventional telephone 
and enhanced services so long that equipment was necessary to providing conventional telephone 
service.  Furthermore, any company obtaining interconnection or UNE access to provide 
telecommunications services may offer information services through the same arrangement.  The 
order did mandate UNE access to all loops connecting central offices to end users, including the 
loops used to provide DSL.  The order also obligated incumbent local telephone company to 
fulfill any requests to condition existing loops to make them DSL compatible.59  A subsequent 
order confirmed that collocation included multifunction equipment that could be used to provide 
both voice and data services.60  Perhaps most importantly, the FCC’s Line Sharing Order 
mandated UNE access to the high frequency portion of the loop used to carry DSL so that two 
competitors could provide services over the same loop, with one offering conventional telephone 
service in the lower frequencies and the other offering DSL in the upper frequencies.61   
 The courts soon began to question the breadth of the FCC’s rulings, beginning with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, which remanded the FCC’s 
initial UNE access rules for construing the “necessary” and “impair” standards too broadly.62  
On remand, the FCC reiterated that incumbent local telephone companies must condition DSL 
loops upon request.  Although UNE access to loops generally included all attached electronics, 
                                                 
59 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report 
and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15691-92 ¶¶ 380-382, 15713 ¶ 427, 15794-95 ¶¶ 580-581, 15990 ¶ 995 (1996). 
60 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and 
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4776-79 ¶¶ 27-31 (1999). 
61 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Third Report and 
Order in CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912 (2000).   
62 525 U.S. 366, 387-92 (1999). 
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the FCC specifically excepted packet switches and DSLAMs on the grounds that the incumbents 
did not maintain a monopoly position with respect to these functions and that granting UNE 
access to them would deter investment in a nascent market.  The FCC did permit UNE access to 
DSLAMs located in remote terminals that were too small to permit physical collocation.63   
 In 2000, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s decision permitting the collocation of 
multifunction equipment as a violation of the statutory provision authorizing collocation only if 
“necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements.”64  In response, the 
FCC revised its rules in 2001 to limit collocation of multifunction equipment to equipment 
whose primary purpose is to provide the requesting carrier either with interconnection that is 
“equal in quality” to the that provided by the incumbent local telephone company for its own 
services or with “nondiscriminatory access” to an unbundled network element, a revision that 
survived judicial review.65  These revisions to the collocation rules were sufficient to survive 
judicial scrutiny.66   
 These judicial decisions eventually led the FCC to begin a broader retreat from extending 
the regulatory regime applicable to conventional telephone service to DSL and other wireline 
broadband technologies.  In 2002, shortly before adopting its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 
the FCC issued its Wireline Broadband NPRM, which tentatively concluded that DSL and other 
broadband services provided by local telephone companies constituted “information services” 
that were not subject to the tariffing and common carriage requirements of Title II of the 
Communications Act of 1934.  At the same time, the FCC sought comment on whether changes 
                                                 
63 Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and 
Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3775 ¶ 172, 3776-77 ¶ 175, 3783-84 
¶¶ 190-194, 3835-37 ¶¶ 306-309, 3839-40 ¶¶ 314-317 (1999). 
64 GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 422-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6)).   
65 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Fourth Report and 
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15435, 15452-60 ¶¶ 32-44 (2001).  
66 Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2002).   
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in technology and the competitive environment justified modifying or eliminating the regulatory 
regime created by its Computer Inquiries.67  Later in 2002, the FCC detariffed DSL services that 
SBC offered through its separate subsidiary.68   
 In 2002, the D.C. Circuit further hastened the deregulation of DSL by striking down the 
FCC’s decision requiring line sharing, reasoning that the FCC’s findings that DSL faced robust 
competition from cable modem providers meant that line sharing violated the “necessary” and 
“impair” requirements of the 1996 Act.69  This led the FCC to eliminate line sharing and lifted 
UNE access obligations to most high-capacity loops in its landmark 2003 Triennial Review 
Order.  The FCC also eliminated the limited exceptions it had recognized for UNE access to 
DSLAMs and other packet switching equipment.70  Although the D.C. Circuit would invalidate 
other portions of the Triennial Review Order, it explicitly affirmed this portion of the FCC’s 
decision.71  In 2005, the FCC also responded to concerns that last-mile providers were blocking 
access to certain applications when it sanctioned a small rural local telephone company known as 
Madison River Communications, which was attempting to preserve its local telephone revenues 
by preventing its DSL customers from accessing using the ports needed to access Internet 
telephony.72
                                                 
67 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3029-33 ¶¶ 17-24, 3040-43 ¶¶ 43-53 (2002) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband 
NPRM]. 
68 Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Services, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 27000 (2002). 
69 United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Inquiry Concerning 
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and 
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 2865 ¶ 48 (2002); First Section 706 Report, supra 
note 16, at 2423 ¶ 48. 
70 Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Report and 
Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, 17327-33 ¶¶ 549-580 
(2003) [hereinafter Triennial Review Order]. 
71 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 578-85 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
72 Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005). 
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 Most importantly, the FCC issued its Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order 
in 2005, which as of now represents the most complete statement of the FCC’s last-mile 
broadband policy.  This order ruled that DSL and other broadband services provided by local 
telephone companies constitute information services that were not subject to Title II’s common 
carriage and tariffing requirements, in essence extending to DSL the same reasoning embodied in 
the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and endorsed by the Supreme Court in Brand X.  In 
addition, the order eliminated all Computer Inquiry requirements with respect to all broadband 
technologies used to provide Internet service, although this ruling did not extend them to 
broadband technologies used to provide traditional telephone service, such as frame relay 
services, stand-alone asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) services, and gigabit Ethernet services.  
The FCC also found insufficient evidence to justify mandating nondiscriminatory access to 
content and applications providers, while reserving the right to change its mind should 
circumstances warrant doing so.73  At the same time, the FCC issued a Policy Statement 
recognizing its intention to preserve consumers’ rights to access content, run applications, and 
attach devices as they see fit, subject to the needs of law enforcement, protection against harm to 
the network, and reasonable network management.74  The Wireline Broadband Internet Access 
Services Order was sustained on judicial review.75
                                                 
73 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order 
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14860-61 ¶ 9 & n.15, 14862-65 ¶¶ 12-17, 14875-79 ¶ 41-
46 & n.107, 14882-98 ¶¶ 32-85, 14904 ¶ 96 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services 
Order], petition for review denied sub nom. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007).  
74 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 
F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005).   
75 Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007).
20 
C. The Current Regulatory Status of Last-Mile Broadband Networks 
 Since the Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, the FCC has taken 
additional steps to deregulate broadband services provided by local telephone companies.  For 
example, the FCC has granted waivers giving Verizon, AT&T, and Qwest pricing flexibility for 
certain business-oriented broadband technologies subject to price cap regulation.76  Most 
importantly, the FCC has granted waivers to both Verizon and AT&T deregulating the 
broadband services still subject to the Computer Inquiry rules following the Wireline Broadband 
Internet Access Services Order on the grounds that wireline broadband services face enough 
competition from other providers to justify no longer subjecting them to retail access 
requirements.77  The net result is to eliminate the remaining retail access requirements on 
broadband services provided by local telephone companies. 
 The FCC’s orders clearing a number of recent mergers reaffirmed its decision not to give 
content and applications providers nondiscriminatory access to last-mile broadband networks, 
concluding that competition was sufficiently robust to prevent network providers from 
discriminating against any particular content or applications and pointing to the lack of evidence 
in the record that any network provider had engaged in such practices.78  The FCC has also 
issued rulings declaring that broadband over power line and wireless networks constitute 
                                                 
76 Petition for Waiver of Pricing Flexibility Rules for Fast Pack Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
20 F.C.C.R. 16840 (2005); SBC Communications Inc. Petition for Wavier of Section 61.42 of the Commission’s 
Rules, 22 F.C.C.R. 7224 (2007); Qwest Petition for Waiver of Pricing Flexibility Rules for Advanced 
Communications Networks Services, 22 F.C.C.R. 7482 (2007).  
77 Petition of AT&T Inc. for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules 
with Respect to Its Broadband Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 18705, 18718-19 ¶ 22, 
18723-24 ¶ 30 (2007); Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Verizon Telephone Companies’ Petition for 
Forbearance from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to their Broadband Services Is Granted by 
Operation of Law (Mar. 20, 2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
264436A1.pdf. 
78 AT&T-BellSouth Order, supra note 9, at 5727-31 ¶¶ 116-120, 5742-46 ¶¶ 151-153; Adelphia Order, supra 
note 9, at 8296-99 ¶¶ 217-223; Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 9, at 18507-09 ¶¶ 139-142; SBC-AT&T Order, 
supra note 9, at 18365-68 ¶¶ 140-143.   
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information services.79  Most recently, in March 2007, the FCC issued a notice of inquiry 
seeking specific examples of network providers disfavoring particular content and seeking 
comment on the impact of any such behavior on consumers.80
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TRADITIONAL RATIONALES FOR REGULATING 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO LAST-MILE BROADBAND NETWORKS 
 Many of the proponents of open access to cable modem systems and network neutrality 
argue, at least in part, that the mandatory interconnection and nondiscrimination regime imposed 
on local telephone networks should be extended to last-mile broadband networks as well.  
Unfortunately, most of these proposals take this position without undertaking any extended 
analysis of whether the rationales used to justify mandating access to local telephone networks 
apply with equal force to broadband.  Blind application of a regulatory regime developed for a 
different technology and different market conditions can lead to regulation that lacks any 
theoretical justification and can impede technological innovation and consumer welfare.  Indeed, 
both the Supreme Court and the FCC have warned of the dangers of reflexively extending legacy 
regulation to broadband on the basis of “history, rather than on an analysis of contemporaneous 
market conditions.”81
 This Part seeks to address this issue directly by examining whether the rationales invoked 
to justify mandating access to local telephone networks apply to broadband.  The specific 
rationales that we consider include natural monopoly, network economic effects, vertical 
                                                 
79 United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband 
over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 
13281 (2006); Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 
Declaratory Ruling, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901 (2007). 
80 Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894 (2007).  
81 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 (2005); accord Wireline 
Broadband Internet Access Services Order, supra note 73, at 14879 ¶ 126 (quoting this language with approval). 
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exclusion, and the desirability of managed competition.  Our analysis shows that the emergence 
of competition in last-mile broadband services has opened up the policy space in important ways 
that undercut many of the classic bases for regulation.  In addition, the increased importance on 
investment incentives, the complexity of the relevant interfaces, and the rapid pace of 
technological change also effect fundamental changes to the policy analysis. 
A. Natural Monopoly 
 One of the bedrock assumptions of telecommunications policy is that local telephone 
networks are natural monopolies.  Natural monopoly represented one of the central justifications 
for early regulatory efforts in the 1920s82 as well as the Communications Act of 1934.83  Indeed, 
the entire telephone network was regarded as a natural monopoly until the 1960s.84  Even after 
the FCC began to promote competition in complementary services, such telephone handsets and 
other customer premises equipment (CPE), long distance, and information services, 
policymakers continued to believe that local telephone service remained a natural monopoly.85  
As the FCC has noted, “At the time the Computer Inquiry rules were adopted, there was an 
                                                 
82 S. REP. NO. 67-75, at 1 (1921). 
83 Hearings on S. 2910 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong. 100 (1934) (testimony 
of AT&T President Walter Gifford), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, 
at 119,  (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989). 
84 GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL 107 (1987); PETER HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 2.1.1, at 84, § 2.1.2, at 86 (2d ed. 1999). 
85 See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 475-76 (2002) (noting that at the time of the 
breakup of AT&T, local telephone service was “thought to be the root of natural monopoly in the 
telecommunications industry”); United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 537038 (D.D.C. 1987) (concluding 
that “[t]he exchange monopoly of the Regional Companies has continued because it is a natural monopoly”), aff’d, 
894 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 14171, 14173-74 ¶ 4 (1996) (noting that the 
Communications Act of 1934 was grounded on the notion that local and long distance telephony constituted natural 
monopolies and that the breakup of AT&T continued to treat local telephone service as a natural monopoly); 2 
ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:  PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 127 (1971) (“That the 
provision of local telephone service is a natural monopoly is generally conceded.”); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION 
AND ITS REFORM 291 (1982) (“Local telephone service seems to be generally accepted as a natural monopoly.”). 
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implicit, if not explicit, assumption that the incumbent wireline platform would remain the only 
network platform available to enhanced service providers.”86   
 A given production technology is said to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics if it is 
subadditive, which occurs when a single firm can supply the entire market demand at lower cost 
than could two or more firms.  A sufficient condition for subadditivity is when the economies of 
scale are so large that the average cost curve declines over the entire industry output.  When 
average cost is declining, larger producers are able to produce at lower cost, which in turn allows 
them to underprice their competitors.  The lower price allows them to capture a still larger share 
of the market, which causes the cost advantage enjoyed by the largest player to widen still 
further.  This process will continue until all of other producers are driven from the market. 
 The classic source of scale economies in the telecommunications industry is the presence 
of large fixed costs.  For example, spreading a $120 million sunk-cost investment across one 
million customers would require allocating an average of $120 in sunk costs to each customer.  If 
the provider were able to reach one million additional customers, each consumer would have to 
pay only an average of $60 in order to cover sunk costs.  Increasing the customer base an 
additional million to three million allows the fixed costs allocated to each customer to drop to 
$40.  The addition of additional customers would cause the contribution that fixed costs make to 
average costs to decline still further, although the size of the decline will become smaller. 
 Stated slightly more generally, in typical markets the average cost curve is U-shaped.  On 
the one hand, the amortization of fixed costs over increasingly large volumes places downward 
pressure on average cost, although the marginal impact of this effect will decay exponentially as 
                                                 
86 Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, supra note 73, at 14877 ¶ 43; accord Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 (2005); Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling & 
NPRM, supra note 38, at 4825 ¶ 44; Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 67, at 3037 ¶ 36. 
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production increases.  At the same time, the scarcity of factors of production and the principle of 
diminishing marginal returns places upward pressure on average costs to increase as volume 
increases.  Whether average cost is rising or falling at any particular point is determined by 
which of these two effects dominates the other.  If fixed costs are sufficiently large relative to 
demand, the former effect will dominate the latter over the entire range of industry output. 
 Natural monopoly gives rise to two normative implications.  First, like all monopolists, 
natural monopolists tend to charge prices that are inefficiently high and to produce quantities that 
are inefficiently low.  Second, because the market ultimately reaches equilibrium with only one 
producer, the fixed costs incurred by any subsequent entrant will inevitably end up being wasted, 
since only one set of capital assets will ultimately end up being used.   
 At the same time, the scale economies that lead to natural monopolies can be dissipated 
either if technology causes the fixed costs needed to create and operate a telecommunications 
network to fall.  This may cause the average cost curve to shift inward to the point where more 
than one firm can operate on the increasing portion of the average cost curve, at which point 
competition becomes sustainable.  Changes on the demand side can also dissipate natural 
monopolies.  An increase in the total demand for the services provided by the network can shift 
the industry demand outward to the point where firms no longer operate on the declining portion 
of the average cost curve. 
 Commentators have long disputed whether local telephone networks constitute natural 
monopolies.  Indeed, studies suggest that during the competitive era that flourished following the 
expiration of the original Bell telephone patents in 1896 and peaked in 1907, the diseconomies of 
scale in switching were so severe as to offset any scale economies resulting from the 
amortization of the fixed costs needed to established the network of wires used for the 
25 
distribution of telephone service.87  In more modern times, a vibrant empirical literature emerged 
debating whether local telephone networks were natural monopolies, with some studies 
concluding that local telephone service was subadditive88  and others drawing the opposite 
conclusion.89
 Because local distribution of cable programming required the deployment of a network of 
wires as extensive as that required to establish local telephone service, regulatory authorities and 
commentators have also regarded cable television as a natural monopoly.90  Courts have 
followed suit, invoking the natural monopoly rationale when sustaining cable regulations against 
a variety of legal challenges.91  Other scholars have questioned whether the cost functions of the 
cable industry exhibited sufficient natural monopoly characteristics to justify entry restrictions 
                                                 
87 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet:  The Hidden 
Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1891-93 (2007); Milton Mueller, The Switchboard Problem:  Scale, 
Signaling, and Organization in Manual Telephone Swathing, 1877-1897, 30 TECH. & CULTURE 534 (1989). 
88 Abraham Charnes et al., A Goal Programming/Constrained Regression Review of the Bell System Breakup, 
34 MGMT. SCI. 1 (1988); Lars-Hendrik Röller, Proper Quadratic Cost Functions with an Application to the Bell 
System, 72 REV. ECON. & STAT. 202 (1990); Lars-Hendrik Röller, Modeling Cost Structure:  The Bell System 
Revisited, 22 APPLIED ECON. 1161 (1990); Wesley W. Wilson & Yimin Zhou, Telecommunications Deregulation 
and Subadditive Costs:  Are Local Telephone Monopolies Natural?, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 909 (2001); see also 
David Gabel & D. Mark Kennet, Economies of Scope in the Local Telephone Exchange Market, 6 J. REG. ECON. 381 
(1994); F. Gasmi et al., The Natural Monopoly Test Reconsidered:  An Engineering Process-Based Approach to 
Empirical Analysis in Telecommunications, 20 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 435 (2002). 
89 David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, Multiproduct Cost Function Estimates and Natural Monopoly Tests 
for the Bell System, in BREAKING UP BELL 127 (David S. Evans ed., 1983); David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, A 
Test for Subadditivity with an Application to the Bell System, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 615 (1984); Richard T. Shin & 
John S. Ying, Unnatural Monopolies in Local Telephone, 23 RAND J. ECON. 171 (1992); Sanford V. Berg & John 
Tschirhart, A Market Test for Natural Monopoly in the Local Exchange, 8 J. REG. ECON. 103 (1995).  
90 See, e.g., CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMC’NS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 24, 43 (1974); G. KENT 
WEBB, THE ECONOMICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 106 (1983); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release (Apr. 1, 1985), 
quoted in Glenn B. Manishin, Antitrust and Regulation in Cable Television:  Federal Policy at War with Itself, 6 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 75, 87 (1987); Eli M. Noam, Economies of Scale in Cable Television: A Multiproduct 
Analysis, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 93 (Eli M. Noam ed., 
1985). 
91 See Cmty. Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378-79 (10th Cir. 1981); Omega Satellite 
Prods. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982); Lamb Enters. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 
511 (6th Cir. 1972); Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 586 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff’d, 853 F.2d 
1084 (3d Cir. 1988);Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985-86 (D.R.I. 1983); 
Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543, 547 (W.D. Ky. 1982); see also 
Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1563 (5th Cir. 1984) (accepting as true allegation that 
cable was a natural monopoly). 
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and rate regulation92 and have debated whether some alternative institutional regime, such as 
franchise bidding, might redress any problems that might arise.93  Some courts have followed 
suit, questioning whether cable television was a natural monopoly.94  The three cases in which 
full trials were conducted on whether cable television constitutes a natural monopoly have split 
on the issue, with the one jury concluding that it was not a natural monopoly95 and the other two 
juries drawing the opposite conclusion.96
 Most importantly for our purposes, commentators began to suggest that intermodal 
competition from broadcasters and local telephone companies might provide sufficient 
competition to vitiate cable’s natural monopoly status.97  Consistent with this insight, a provision 
                                                 
92 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable 
Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1364-75 (1986) (concluding that cable television is probably not a natural 
monopoly and that even if it is, the benefits from temporary competition probably outweigh the costs of restricting 
entry); William E. Lee, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867, 880-88 (1983) (noting 
the lack of empirical proof that cable television is a natural monopoly and warning of the dangers of improper 
market definition); Bruce M. Owen & Peter R. Greenhalgh, Competitive Considerations in Cable Television 
Franchising, CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES, Apr. 1986, at 69 (concluding that the scale economies in cable are not 
sufficiently substantial as to preclude the possibility of competition). 
93 See Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 98, 110-13 (1972) (arguing that periodic auctioning of cable franchises can replace rate 
regulation); Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Building for Natural Monopolies--In General and with Respect to 
CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 90-91 (1976) (identifying contracting problems with Posner’s proposal and providing an 
empirical example in which franchise bidding was not superior to regulation); Mark A. Zupan, The Efficacy of 
Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television:  Some Systemic Evidence, 32 J.L. & ECON. 401 (1989) 
(discussing possible solutions to contracting problems and providing more systematic empirical evidence supporting 
for Posner’s claim). 
94 See Quincy Cable Television, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (questioning the 
natural monopoly rationale for regulating cable); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1039-
40 (D. Colo.), rev’d, 603 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev’d, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (disagreeing that the evidence showed 
that cable television was a natural monopoly); Cmty. Commc’ns Co., 603 F.2d at 712 (Markey, C.J., dissenting) 
(expressing his agreement with the district court’s conclusion); see also Preferred Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985) (accepting as true allegation that sufficient economic demand existed 
to support more than one cable operator), aff’d, 476 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1986) (same); Tele-Commc’ns of Key West, 
Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same). 
95 Pac. W. Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1328, 1339, 1349 (E.D. Cal. 1987).  
96 Nor-W. Cable Commc’ns P’ship v. City of St. Paul, No. 3-83 Civ. 1228, 1998 WL 241122 (D. Minn. June 
10, 1988); Central Telecomms., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 891, 901 & n.33, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1985), 
aff’d, 800 F.2d 711, 713-18 (8th Cir. 1986). 
97 See GEORGE H. SHAPIRO ET AL. CABLESPEECH 8-13 (1983) (noting that competition from alternative 
broadcast technologies left cable’s natural monopoly status “open to serious question”); Eli M. Noam, Local 
Distribution Monopolies in Cable Television and Telephone Service: The Scope for Competition, in 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 351, 359-65, 376-86 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1983) (questioning the 
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of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 authorized the FCC to determine when cable 
operators face effective competition sufficient to justify eliminating rate regulation.98  The FCC 
concluded that such competition could come from broadcasters or from a second cable television 
system or some other multichannel competitor.99  Congress rejected the FCC’s conclusion that 
broadcasting could serve as effective competition, but ratified the decision that cable operators 
might face effective competition from other multichannel video providers.100   
 The insight that intermodal competition can eliminate natural monopoly has even 
stronger implications for broadband data networks.  The shift to digital transmission has allowed 
networks that once were dedicated exclusively to voice or to video to compete with one another.  
Cable companies have begun to offer voice services and to promote them aggressively.  
Telephone companies have begun to offer multichannel television through VDSL and through 
fiber-based transmission networks, such as Verizon’s FiOS service.  Most importantly for our 
purposes, digitization has allowed both telephone and cable companies to compete directly with 
respect to last-mile broadband services.  Thus, regardless of whether cable or conventional 
telephone was once a natural monopoly with respect to the services they used to provide, 
                                                                                                                                                             
effectiveness of competition from other spectrum-based media, but concluding telephone companies could serve as 
effective competitors). 
98 Pub. L. No. 98-549, sec. 2, § 623(b), 98 Stat. 2779, 2788 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1)).   
99 FCC initially ruled that cable operators face effective competition whenever they face competition from at 
least three over-the-air broadcast stations, which effectively eliminated rate regulation for 96.5% of all cable 
systems.  Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Report and Order, 50 
Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,648-50 ¶¶ 91-100 (May 2, 1985), aff’d sub nom. ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1564-65 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987).  The FCC later raised the threshold of effective competition to six over-the-air stations, which effectively 
limited rate deregulation to 30% of all cable subscribers.  Cable operators faced effective competition if another 
cable provider could provide service to 50% of the homes in any service area and actually provided service to 10% 
of those homes.  Reexamination of the Effective Competition Standard for the Regulation of Cable Television 
Service Rates, Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 4545, 4547-51 
¶¶ 7-30 (1991).   
100 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 3(a), 
§ 623(l)(1), 106 Stat. 1460, 1470 (repealing regulations providing that broadcasting could constitute effective 
competition and raising the threshold of those actually served to 15%).   
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econometric studies confirm that consumers regard DSL and cable modem service as close 
substitutes for one another.101
 The tendency toward natural monopoly created by the fixed costs is also substantially 
mitigated by the decommodification of telecommunications technologies and the increasing 
differentiation among the services provided by different network providers.102  It has been 
recognized since Edward Chamberlin’s seminal work on monopolistic competition103 that 
product differentiation can allow markets to reach equilibrium with multiple producers even 
though each is producing on the declining portion of the average cost curve.  In other words, so 
long as products are differentiated, the existence of unexhausted economies of scale need not 
necessarily force a market to collapse into a natural monopoly. 
 Technological improvements have also caused the fixed costs needed to provide 
broadband service to fall precipitously, which weakens the tendency toward natural monopoly.  
In addition, the emergence of wireless transmission implicates the theory of contestable markets, 
which takes issue the prior scholarship arguing that high fixed costs necessarily represent a 
barrier to entry.104  Contestability theory draws on the insight that high fixed costs need not 
inexorably lead to natural monopoly if a new entrant can resell its assets should it have to exit.  
So long as fixed costs are not also sunk costs, any attempt by an existing player to charge 
supracompetitive prices will only invite hit-and-run entry by firms that gather the available 
profits and depart as soon as competition drives prices down to competitive levels.   
                                                 
101 See Robert W. Crandall et al., The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband Internet 
Access, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 954, 973 (2002); Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband 
Internet Access for Residential Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 302 (2001). 
102 Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 27-33 (2005). 
103 EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 194-95 (8th ed. 1962). 
104 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 279-
303 (rev. ed. 1987).  
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 Contestability theory underscores a critical difference between wireless and wireline 
transmission technologies.  Because telephone wires have historically been useless for any other 
purpose, fixed cost investments in telephone wires can properly be regarded as sunk costs and 
thus a potential source of market failure.  The same is not necessarily true for the infrastructure 
needed to construct a wireless transmission network.  Wireless technologies require equipment 
located on transmission towers as well as the legal right to use particular portions of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.  Since alternatives uses exist for both of these assets (either by other 
wireless telephone providers or by providers of wireless broadband or other spectrum-based 
services), investments in wireless network technologies are less likely to be regarded as sunk 
costs and thus less likely to give rise to the market failures associated with natural monopoly. 
 At the same time, the development of innovative new Internet-based services has caused 
the demand curve for broadband networks to shift outward, further ameliorating the tendency 
toward natural monopoly.  This combination of reductions in fixed costs and increases the 
demand for network services tends to push markets for broadband services away from natural 
monopoly.  Multiple facilities-based providers now vie to provide broadband communications to 
large business enterprises.  In addition, intermodal competition from different wireline and 
wireless technologies is having the same effect on the residential and small business market as 
well. 
 It thus comes as little surprise that the FCC has specifically rejected the conclusion that 
last-mile broadband services constitute a natural monopoly.  For example, its initial report on 
broadband deployment specifically found that “no competitor has a large embedded base of 
paying residential consumers” and “[t]he record does not indicate that the consumer market [for 
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broadband services] is inherently a natural monopoly.”105  The D.C. Circuit emphasized the 
importance of taking intermodal competition into account when invalidating the FCC’s Line 
Sharing Order on the grounds that fierce competition from cable modem service rendered the 
agency’s conclusion that competitors would be impaired without access to the high-frequency 
portion of the loop unreasonable.106  More recently, the FCC’s Wireline Broadband Internet 
Access Services Order also noted that “broadband Internet access services have never been 
restricted to a single network platform,” which stood “in stark contrast to the information 
services market at the time the Computer Inquiry obligations were adopted, when only a single 
platform capable of delivering such services was contemplated and only a single facilities-based 
provider of that platform was available to deliver them to any particular end users.”  Tendencies 
toward natural monopoly are further alleviated by the increase in demand created by innovative 
broadband service offerings, such as VoIP.  The presence of such intermodal competition, 
combined with the growth of demand, eliminated the need for extending the access requirements 
imposed by the Computer Inquiries to broadband.107
 In short, the emergence of intermodal competition eviscerates claims that any particular 
last-mile broadband service is a natural monopoly.  Although cable modem service took the early 
lead, the FCC’s most recent data indicates that DSL has eroded much of cable modem’s early 
dominance, capturing 36% of the broadband market and growing at a rate of 36% at the end of 
2006, compared to the 53% market share and growth rate of 21% achieved by cable modem 
service.108  As noted earlier, wireless broadband has also emerged as another important 
                                                 
105 First Section 706 Report, supra note 69, at 2423 ¶ 48. 
106 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
107 Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, supra note 73, at 4880 ¶ 47, 14894 ¶ 76. 
108 High-Speed Services Dec. 2006 Report, supra note 1, at tbl.1. 
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competitor, having signed up 45 million subscribers as of September 2007.109  The deployment 
of fiber-based technologies, WiFi mesh networks, satellite broadband networks, and other last-
mile broadband technologies is likely to cause intermodal competition to intensify even further 
in the future. 
 Natural monopoly would thus appear to offer little promise as a justification for 
mandating access to last-mile broadband services.  Even if competition is limited to a small 
number of players, as some studies have suggested,110 the emergence of sustainable oligopolistic 
competition nonetheless alters the policy balance in significant ways.  When policymakers are 
confronted with a choice between regulated and unregulated monopoly, the large welfare losses 
associated with monopoly pricing arguably justify regulation despite the well recognized defects 
and distortions that plague such regulation.  When the decision is between regulated and 
unregulated oligopoly, the policy balance is quite different.  Theoretical and economic research 
has shown that oligopolies, while still falling short of the competitive ideal, perform far better 
than monopolies to the point where incurring the costs of ex ante regulation is no longer 
justified.111
 But perhaps the most revolutionary change from the perspective of natural monopoly 
theory is the emergence of wireless broadband technologies.  When evaluated in terms of “high-
speed lines,” which the FCC defines as those capable of providing 200 kbps in at least one 
direction, wireless services have exploded from having no subscribers at the end of 2004 to 
                                                 
109 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
110 See Gerald R. Faulhaber & Christiaan Hogendorn, The Market Structure of Broadband 
Telecommunications, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 305, 326 (2000). 
111 See Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Completion:  Toward a New Model for 
Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 77-93 (2007); Nakahata, supra note 97, at 179. 
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capturing almost 35 million subscribers and 35% of the market by the middle of 2007.112  Since 
that time, the number of subscribers to third-generation wireless broadband has continued to 
grown, reaching 45 million by September 2007.113  The impending redeployment of spectrum 
reclaimed from broadcasters following the transition to digital television should increase the 
competitiveness of the space still further.114  The resulting increase in intermodal competition 
should put to rest any further attempts to base broadband regulation on natural monopoly. 
B. Network Economic Effects 
 Some commentators have invoked network economic effects as a justification for 
regulating access to last-mile broadband networks.  The classic argument is that network 
economic effects can give the early leaders a decisive advantage.  Because the value of the 
network increases with the number of others users connected to the network, new customers will 
flock to the technology that gets off to the fastest start, with the subsequent increase in network 
size causing the advantages created by network economic effects to increase still further.  These 
demand-side scale economies cause the technology establishing the early lead to become “locked 
in,” which in turn becomes a source of market power.   
 Some commentators have argued that network economic effects provide cable modem 
providers with a competitive advantage in precisely this manner.  Given cable modem providers’ 
early lead, the subsequent emergence of DSL and other technologies may not be sufficient to 
dislodge them.  Once so entrenched, cable modem providers could deploy proprietary protocols 
                                                 
112 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, High-Speed Services for Internet Access:  Status as of June 30, 2007, at tbl.1 
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113 Jim Ross, Casting the Mobile Net, at http://www.ctia.org/content/index.cfm/AID/11203 (last visited March 
19, 2008). 
114 See Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, Second Report and Order, 22 
F.C.C.R. 15289 (2007). 
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that raise switching costs and permit them to exercise market power against unaffiliated content 
providers.115  Other commentators have similarly emphasized how content and applications 
providers benefit from interoperable architectures that allow them to reach the widest possible 
customer base.  The early lead established by cable modem providers can allow them to deploy 
proprietary protocols that can chill innovation by reducing the number of customers any content 
or application provider can reach.116   
 We discuss the theoretical limitations of the literature on network economic effects at 
length elsewhere117 and only emphasize a few points here.  As an initial matter, concerns about 
existing market shares are largely misplaced in markets undergoing rapid growth.  As the 
theoretical literature emphasizes, equilibria in markets subject to network economic effects 
depend not on current market shares, but rather the market structure expected to result after the 
market has reached maturity.  For growing markets, the fact that a particular network may 
currently dominate a market is thus of little consequence.  People concerned about lock-in will 
focus on the network that will exist in the future, not the one that exists today.118
                                                 
115 Jerry A. Hausman et al., Residential Demand for Broadband Telecommunications and Consumer Access to 
Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 161-62, 163-65 (2001). 
116 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 40-41, 156, 161-62, 171 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence 
Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 925, 932-33, 945-46, 950-54 (2001). 
117 See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON 
REG. 171, 278-82 (2002); Spulber & Yoo, supra note 3, at 921-22. 
118 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 
55, 67, 73 (1992) (concluding that exponential market growth effectively prevents excess inertia); S.J. Liebowitz & 
Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 292 
(1996) (“Entrenched incumbents are less entrenched when consumers react to new sales . . . .”); Carl Shapiro, 
Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare:  Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 490 (1995) (A manufacturer 
will find installed-base opportunism less attractive, the greater is the growth rate of the market, the greater are its 
prospects to gain market share.”).  Liebowitz and Margolis elaborate: 
 
[T]here are additional conditions that can contribute to the ascendancy of the efficient standard.  
An important one is the growth of the activity that uses the standard.  If a market is growing 
rapidly, the number of users who have made commitments to any standard is small relative to the 
number of future users.  Sales of audiocassette players were barely hindered by their 
incompatibility with the reel-to-reel or eight-track players that preceded them.  Sales of sixteen-bit 
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 In addition, the market failures identified by the formal economic models depend on the 
assumption that the relevant markets are either dominated by a single firm or highly 
concentrated.119  In the absence of such market structures, the primary impact of network 
economic effects is to provide powerful incentives for network owners to interconnect with one 
another even in the absence of regulation.120  Competition among a sufficient number of equally 
sized players should be sufficient to eliminate any anticompetitive incentives to refuse to 
interconnect.121   
 Even if the market is sufficiently concentrated to raise concerns about monopolistic 
dominance and technological lock-in, it is far from clear that other features of the market and the 
structure of consumer preferences might not mitigate, if not eliminate, any adverse effects.  For 
example, the market may also dislodge an existing network technology so long as the new 
technology provides additional value that exceeds the value derived from the size of old 
                                                                                                                                                             
computers were scarcely hampered by their incompatibility with the disks or operating systems of 
eight-bit computers.  In each of these cases, rapid market growth was sufficient to overcome such 
incompatibility. 
 
Liebowitz & Margolis, supra, at 312. 
119 See Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete:  Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardization, J. ECON. PERSP., Spr. 1994, 117, 119-29; Jacques Crémer, Patrick Rey, & Jean Tirole, Connectivity 
in the Commercial Internet, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 433 (2000); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption 
in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822 (1986). 
120 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 
1994, at 93, 105 (noting that “[i]n markets with network effects, there is natural tendency toward de facto 
standardization”). 
121 Gerald R. Faulhaber, Bottlenecks and Bandwagons: Access Policy in the New Telecommunications, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 487, 501-02 (Samit K. Majumdar et al. eds., 2005) (pointing out 
that in mature markets consisting of a small number of firms of roughly equal size, “the only stable outcome (i.e., 
the market equilibrium) is for all firms to interconnect”); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, 
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 429 (1985) (noting that “[a]s the number of firms becomes 
increasingly large,” equilibrium in which all firms interconnect converges to perfectly competitive equilibrium); see 
also Nicholas Economides, The Economics of the Internet Backbone, in 2 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ECONOMICS, supra, at 371, 390 (recognizing that network economic effects give firms strong incentives to 
interconnect). 
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network.122  This particularly true, given that, after networks have captured a sufficient number 
of subscribers, the marginal benefit from adding another subscriber is likely to be low, which 
would greatly reduce the magnitude of any potential externality.123   
 In addition, heterogeneity of consumer preferences can mitigate the demand-side 
economies scale associated with network economic effects in much the same way that they can 
mitigate the supply-side economies of scale associated with large fixed costs.124  As Michael 
Katz and Carl Shapiro have noted “Customer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to 
limit tipping and sustain multiple networks.  If the rival systems have distinct features sought by 
certain customers, two or more systems may be able to survive by catering to consumers who 
care more about product attributes than network size.  Here, market equilibrium with multiple 
incompatible products reflects the social value of variety.”125
 Determining the optimal number of networks and the optimal timing of technological 
change requires a careful balance of the relevant costs and benefits.  Furthermore, even proof of 
the existence of the necessary empirical preconditions for network-induced market failure would 
not necessarily support regulatory intervention.  Consider, for example, the particular regulatory 
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decisions associated with any state-sponsored attempt to solve the problems of technological 
lock-in.  Such intervention would necessarily require the government to replace clear winners in 
the technology marketplace with what it believed represented the superior technology.  
Moreover, in order to be effective, the government must do so at an early stage in the 
technology’s development, when making such determinations is the most difficult.  Regulators 
would also typically have to make such determinations on extremely thin information that in 
most cases would be provided by parties with a direct interest in the outcome of the regulatory 
process.  In addition, decisionmakers would have to insulate themselves from the types of 
systematic biases traditionally associated with political decisionmaking processes.  It is for these 
reasons that some of the most distinguished network economic effects theorists caution that 
governmental intervention might well make the problem worse, not better.126   
 The FCC has invoked many of these arguments when declining to mandate access to 
different types of networks.  For example, the FCC has repeatedly refused to mandate wireless or 
backbone interconnection, reasoning that the fact that the market consisted of multiple players of 
roughly equal size already provided powerful incentives to interconnect.127  In addition, the 
FCC’s Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order took these considerations into 
account when it rejected arguments based on current market data as “limited and static” and 
incomplete for “fail[ing] to recognize the dynamic nature of marketplace forces.”  Emerging 
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127 See, e.g., Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 
F.C.C.R. 9610, 9656 ¶ 127 (2001) (“The backbones appear to be successfully negotiating interconnection 
agreements among themselves without any regulatory intervention, and we see no reason to intervene in this 
efficiently functioning market.”); Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio 
Services, Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, 13534 ¶ 28 (2000) (“In view of the growth of competition in 
the [wireless] market, . . . we continue to believe that the best way of achieving interconnection is through voluntary 
private agreements.”). 
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markets like broadband are “more appropriately analyzed in view of larger trends in the 
marketplace, rather than exclusively through the snapshot data that may quickly and predictably 
be rendered obsolete as this market continues to evolve.”  In particular, at the time of the order, 
broadband penetration rates had only reach 20%, while industry analysts forecast that penetration 
would eventually reach 90%.  Thus, it mattered little that the cable modem industry had taken the 
early lead.  In addition, “emerging broadband platforms exert competitive pressure even though 
they currently have few subscribers compared with cable modem service and DSL-based Internet 
access service.”  Competition among current and emerging broadband platforms provided 
sufficient incentives to provide access in the absence of government intervention to justify 
deregulation of last-mile wireline broadband networks.128   
C. Vertical Exclusion 
 The assumption that the telephone network was a natural monopoly gave rise to the 
related concern that the Bell System would use its control over the network to harm competition 
in vertically related markets.  The specific concern was that telephone providers would 
discriminate against independent companies offering complementary services that competed 
with the Bell System’s proprietary offerings.  Vertical exclusion thus represented the driving 
force behind most of the major regulatory initiatives over the past half century.  It formed the 
central motivation for the FCC’s Carterfone rules, which opened up local telephone networks to 
competitively provided customer premises equipment.  Concern that local telephone companies 
would use their monopoly control over the local loop to discriminate against unaffiliated 
enhanced and information service providers represented the analytical rationale for the 
                                                 
128 Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, supra note 73, at 14880-85 ¶¶ 50-61, 14895 ¶ 79. 
38 
nondiscriminatory access requirements imposed by the Computer Inquiries.  It also underlay the 
regulatory proceedings and private antitrust suit by MCI and the government antitrust suit that 
led to the breakup of AT&T, which opened up the Bell System’s local telephone networks to 
competitive long distance services.  It also provided the foundation for the provisions if the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring incumbent local telephone companies to provide 
access all essential elements of their networks on an unbundled basis. 
 The current policy debate focuses on whether the same reasoning should be extended 
from narrowband to broadband.  Vertical exclusion also represents the central justification for 
proposals for open access to cable modem systems and undergirds the ongoing debate over 
network neutrality, which would give content and application providers nondiscriminatory 
access to all last-mile broadband networks. 
 The conventional wisdom with respect to vertical exclusion has undergone a sea change 
over the past half century.129  While economic theorists during the 1950s and 1960s were quite 
hostile toward vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints, such as exclusive dealing 
and long-term contracts, that were tantamount to the same thing, vertical integration is now 
generally recognized to be less problematic than previously believed.  On the contrary, it can 
often be quite economically beneficial.  The driving force behind this transformation is the 
emergence of the so-called “one monopoly rent theorem,” which holds that monopolists have 
little, if any, incentive to engage in vertical exclusion.130  Because there is only one monopoly 
                                                 
129 For overviews of this transformation, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 187-205; Yoo, supra note 10, at 1885-87. 
130 For the seminal statements of the one monopoly rent theorem, see Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying 
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-21 (1957); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law 
and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956). 
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profit available in any vertical chain of production, a monopolist can capture all of that profit 
without having to resort to vertical integration simply by charging the monopoly price.131
 Even more importantly, it is impossible to state a coherent theory of vertical exclusion 
unless two structural preconditions are met.  First, the firm must possess monopoly power in one 
market (typically called the primary market), since without such power the network owner would 
not have anything to use as leverage over the upstream market for complementary services.132  
Second, the market into which the firm seeks to exercise vertical exclusion (called the secondary 
market) must be concentrated and protected by entry barriers.  If no such barriers to entry exist, 
any attempt to raise price in the secondary market will simply attract new competitors until the 
price drops back down to competitive levels.133  Unless these structural preconditions are met, 
the most that vertical integration would do is rearrange distribution patterns.134   
                                                 
131 A simple numerical example, based on a classic opinion written by then-Chief Judge Stephen Breyer, 
illustrates the intuitions underlying the one monopoly rent theorem.  See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 
915 F.2d 17, 32 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.).  Suppose that a firm with a monopoly over refining ore into copper 
ingot sells its output into a competitive market in which firms fabricate the ingot into copper pipe.  Suppose further 
that the cost of refining ore into ingot is $40, that the cost of fabricating the ingot into pipe is $35, and that the 
monopoly price for the final good is $100.  If the monopolist were to vertically integrate into fabrication, it could 
charge $100 for the final good and thereby earn a profit of $25 per unit (i.e., $100 – $40 – $35).  The monopolist 
need not vertically integrate to capture this profit, however.  All it needs to do is price the ingot at $65, which would 
allow it to earn the same profit of $25 per unit (i.e., $65 – $40).  Since the firms fabricating the ingot into pipe face 
competition, they will simply set their markup equal to their costs.  This results in the price of the final good also 
being set at its profit-maximizing price of $100 (i.e., $65 + $35).  Thus, under these circumstances, the monopolist 
gains nothing by vertically integrating into fabrication.  All it needs to do to capture all of the available profit is to 
price the input so that the final good is priced at the monopoly level.   
132 See, e.g., Director & Levi, supra note 130, at 290 (“Firms that are competitive cannot impose coercive 
restrictions on their suppliers or their customers as a means of obtaining a monopoly. They lack the power to do this 
effectively.”). 
133 See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 416-17 (1985); Sam Peltzman, 
Issues in Vertical Integration Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS MERGERS 167, 174 (J. Fred Weston & Sam 
Peltzman eds., 1969). 
134 See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 113-22 (1968); Director & Levi, supra 
note 130, at 293; Peltzman, supra note 133, at 169-70.  The insight can be illustrated through an example based on 
one of the leading Supreme Court cases on vertical integration.  See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 
(1962).  Suppose that the market consists of ten shoe manufacturers each controlling ten percent of the market and 
one hundred independent shoe retailers each controlling one percent of the market.  Suppose further that one of the 
manufacturers decides to stop distributing its products through independent retailers and instead purchases ten of the 
available shoe retailers and sells its shoes only through those outlets.  Would this decision reduce competition in 
either the shoe manufacturing or shoe retailing?  Although competing manufacturers (which comprise ninety percent 
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 The theoretical literature acknowledges the existence of exceptions to the one monopoly 
rent theorem under which vertical integration can be profitable.  As noted earlier, a monopolist 
subject to rate regulation may well find it profitable to integrate vertically.  Gaining control of a 
second, unregulated level of production would allow the firm to earn the profits foreclosed by 
regulators.135  In such cases, it is arguably appropriate to prohibit vertical integration in order to 
isolate and quarantine the monopolist.  Such regulation is justified, however, only when any 
attempt to break up the monopoly would ultimately prove futile.  As the market at issue becomes 
increasingly open to competition, both rate regulation and the concomitant prohibition of vertical 
integration become equally unwarranted. 
 At the same time, economic theorists increasingly recognized that vertical integration 
could yield substantial efficiencies.  For example, if two layers of a vertical chain of distribution 
are monopolistic or oligopolistic, firms in each layer have the incentive to try to extract the 
entirety of the available supracompetitive returns, which would lead to an aggregate price that 
would be even higher than the monopoly price.  Vertical integration can eliminate this so-called 
double marginalization problem, since a company that spans both layers would rationalize the 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the market) will no longer be able to sell their products through the ten shoe retailers that now only sell shoes 
produced by the vertically integrated manufacturer, the remaining independent shoe retailers (which also comprise 
ninety percent of the market) should now have extra capacity from the withdrawal of sales from the vertically 
integrated manufacturer sufficient to provide distribution for all of the other manufacturers’ output.  In this case, 
vertical integration only serves to realign the patterns of distribution without affecting the market shares of either the 
manufacturers or the retailers.  Nor is it likely that the vertically integrated manufacturer could foreclose the retail 
market by purchasing more than ten percent of the available retailing capacity.  In the absence of entry barriers, any 
attempt to lock out other manufacturers by tying up retailers or to extract supracompetitive returns in the retailing 
market would only stimulate entry by new retail outlets that would be ready and willing to distribute the products of 
the other manufacturers. 
135 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 130, at 21-23. For a detailed exposition of AT&T’s use of this form of 
leverage to harm competition for long distance telephony, see Timothy J. Brennan, Why Regulated Firms Should Be 
Kept Out of Unregulated Markets: Understanding the Divestiture in U.S. v. AT&T, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 741 
(1987). 
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decisionmaking between the two levels of production and would avoid the uncoordinated action 
that would make the supracompetitive pricing even worse.136   
 In addition, to the extent that the inputs can be used in variable proportions, any attempt 
to charge supracompetitive prices for one input creates incentives for firms to substitute 
alternative inputs whenever possible.  The resulting substitution creates an alternative potential 
source of inefficiency, as production processes deviate from the most efficient input mix.  
Allowing the provider of the monopolized input to vertically integrate into manufacturing can 
allow it to prevent inefficient input substitution.137  The welfare implications of input 
substitution are ultimately ambiguous, since prohibiting input substitution enhances the 
monopolist’s ability to exercise market power, which can create welfare losses sufficient to 
offset the welfare gains from preventing customers from deviating from the most efficient input 
mix.138  Determining which of the two countervailing effects will dominate can be quite 
difficult.139  The consensus is that any reduction in welfare from preventing input substitution is 
                                                 
136 Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950); see also Fritz 
Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 
(1960) (reviewing the early scholarship on successive monopoly theory). 
137 L.W. McKenzie, Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms, 61 ECON. J. 785 (1951); Bowman, supra 
note 130, at 25-27; M.L Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 68, 76-83 (1960); John M. 
Vernon & Daniel A. Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 79 J. POL. ECON. 924 (1971).  
138 George A. Hay, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Integration, 1 IND. ORG. REV. 188 (1973); Richard 
Schmalensee, A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration, 81 J. POL. ECON. 442, 448 (1973); Frederick R. Warren-
Boulton, Vertical Control with Variable Proportions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 783, 794-96, 798, 799 (1974). 
139 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 523-24 
(3d ed. 1990) (“The mathematical conditions underlying this result are complex.”).  Specifically, the welfare 
tradeoff described above turned largely on the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of demand for the final 
good.  Economists that have assumed that the final product market is perfectly competitive have disagreed over the 
range of elasticities that lead to a price increase.  Compare George A. Hay, An Economic Analysis of Vertical 
Integration, 1 IND. ORG. REV. 188 (1973); Richard Schmalensee, A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration, 81 J. 
POL. ECON. 442 (1973); and Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control with Variable Proportions, 82 J. POL. 
ECON. 783 (1974), with Parthasaradhi Mallela & Babu Nahata, Theory of Vertical Control with Variable 
Proportions, 88 J. POL. ECON. 1007 (1980); and Fred M. Westfield, Vertical Integration: Does Product Price Rise 
or Fall?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 334 (1981).  Scholars that have modeled the final product market as oligopolistic have 
reached similar disagreement.  Compare Michael Waterson, Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and 
Oligopoly, 92 ECON. J. 129, 139 (1982) (concluding that, if the final product market is oligopolistic rather than 
competitive, the impact on welfare depends on the elasticity of substitution), with Masahiro Abiru, Vertical 
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likely to be sufficiently small as not to pose a problem significant enough to be worth 
redressing.140   
 Finally, scholars building on Coase’s seminal work on the theory of the firm141 have 
demonstrated how vertical integration can reduce transaction costs.  One example is the 
elimination of free riding.  For example, suppose that a firm manufactures a technically 
complicated product that requires significant presale services (such as the demonstration of the 
product).  Retailers will have the incentive to shirk in providing such services in the hopes that 
other retailers will bear the costs of providing such services.  If all retailers respond to these 
incentives in the same way, the total amount of presale services will fall below efficient levels.  
A manufacturer facing the possibility of such free riding can either rely on a vertical contractual 
restraint that specifies the level of presale services that each retailer is required to offer or can 
vertically integrate into distribution.  Either solution effectively aligns the retailers’ incentives 
with the manufacturers’.142
 Another oft-cited transaction cost efficiency associated with vertical integration stems 
from the existence of relationship-specific investments, which exist whenever the cost of a 
capital asset exceeds the value of its next-best use.  Relationship-specific investments can create 
appropriable quasi-rents, because they allow others to hold up the investing party in an attempt 
to extract a greater proportion of the joint benefits.  Firms confronting such risks can eliminate 
them either by entering into a vertical contractual restraint (such as an exclusive dealing, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Integration, Variable Proportions, and Successive Oligopolies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 315, 324 (1988) (employing 
similar assumptions to conclude that price will fall and welfare will increase regardless of elasticity of substitution). 
140 Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 183, 192 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (“[I]t is not clear that variable 
proportions raises a major policy issue on vertical integration.”); David Reiffen & Michael Vita, Is There New 
Thinking on Vertical Mergers?, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 917, 923 (1995) (“The variable proportions models of vertical 
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141 R.H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
142 Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). 
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requirements, or long-term contract) or by vertically integrating.  Either solution eliminates the 
incentives for engaging in opportunistic behavior designed to affect the division of profits 
between the two firms.143  Although a lively debate has emerged over the frequency with which 
vertical integration will represent the preferred solution over a vertical contractual restraint,144 
both sides agree about the potential benefits associated with some greater exercise of vertical 
control. 
 Determining whether a particular form of vertical integration will enhance or reduce 
economic welfare is thus an empirical question that turns on the particular market structure and 
the nature of the available efficiencies.  Although some have questioned whether the empirical 
literature is sufficiently developed to support any clear policy inferences,145 recent surveys of the 
empirical literature on vertical integration and vertical restraints found that the existing studies 
                                                 
143 Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and 
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978). 
144 The classic example discussed in the literature is GM’s 1926 acquisition of one of its component 
manufacturers, Fisher Body.  Klein, Crawford, and Alchian argue that the shift from wooden to metal automobile 
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Klein, in turn, responded by arguing that the relevant quasi-rents resulted from firm-specific human (rather than 
physical) capital and by placing greater emphasis on Fisher Body’s supposed refusal to locate its plants near GM’s.  
Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship 
Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199 (1988); Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 
J.L. & ECON. 105 (2000). 
145 See Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 
910-11 (2001); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 
219, 250-58 (1995); William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, 
Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1242, 1252 (1989).  
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overwhelmingly support for the proposition that vertical integration and vertical restraints tend to 
promote, rather than harm, competition.146
 Scholarship associated with the “post-Chicago” school of antitrust law and economics 
has used game theory to study the impact of vertical exclusion when markets function 
imperfectly.  These tools enabled them to identify circumstances under which vertical integration 
can harm competition.  Interestingly, these models presuppose the existence of dominant-firm 
and oligopoly market structures in the primary market, which necessarily presuppose that both 
the primary and secondary markets are highly concentrated and protected by entry barriers.147  In 
the absence of such structural features, these formal models recognize that vertical integration 
may be just as likely to lower price and increase welfare and that the ability of existing players or 
new entrants to expand their outputs will be sufficient to defeat any attempt to increase price 
above competitive levels.148  Furthermore, these models concede that vertical integration may 
lead to efficiencies sufficient to offset any concomitant anti-competitive effects and that whether 
                                                 
146 See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 
639 (2005) (surveying seventeen empirical studies of vertical exclusion and finding that only one found consumer 
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147 See Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
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Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 
103 Q.J. ECON. 345 (1988); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 
268 (1983). 
148 Riordan & Salop, supra note 147, at 532-33;. Salinger, Vertical Mergers in Multi-Product Industries and 
Edgeworth’s Paradox of Taxation, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 545 (1991).  
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a particular instance of vertical integration impedes or promotes competition depends on which 
of these two effects dominates.149   
 There is another line of analysis line of authority that draws on Michael Whinston’s 
seminal analysis of tying to suggest that vertical integration could lead to dynamic 
anticompetitive effects.150  Most of the scenarios analyzed by Whinston presuppose the 
satisfaction of the structural preconditions identified above by assuming that the primary market 
is a monopoly and the secondary market is subject to scale economies.  Whinston does, however, 
consider at least one scenario in which the firm engaged in tying faces a degree of competition.  
Interestingly, although under these circumstances tying can lead to foreclosure, its impact on 
welfare is ultimately ambiguous.  As a result, Whinston explicitly recognized that his model’s 
ambiguous welfare implications, as well as the fact that his model “ignore[s] a number of other 
possible motivations” for tying, undermined its ability to serve as a basis for a practical legal 
standard.151  Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman’s extension of Whinston’s work similarly 
emphasizes the ambiguity of the welfare implications and cautions against proscribing practices 
based on the theoretical possibility of harm without any evaluation of the potential 
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efficiencies.152  Thus, by their own terms, these models provide no support for treating vertical 
practices as illegal per se.  Instead of embracing per se illegality, these models endorse the more 
case-specific analysis associated with the rule of reason. 
 Thus, although the post-Chicago literature has effectively rebutted the Chicago School’s 
calls for per se legality, it has done little to disturb the basic conclusions that vertical integration 
is unlikely to harm competition unless the relevant markets are concentrated and protected by 
entry barriers or that vertical integration may yield efficiencies.  The impact of this critique has 
been quite influential.  Supreme Court doctrine153 and the conventional wisdom among antitrust 
scholars154 have now largely abandoned its hostility toward vertical integration. 
 Most importantly, the same forces that are increasing the competitiveness of every 
portion of the telecommunications industry is eliminating the plausibility that any network 
provider will have a dominant market position to use as leverage over an adjacent market.  The 
foregoing discussions of the natural monopoly and network economic effects justifications for 
regulating last-mile broadband networks demonstrate how emergence of intermodal competition 
is in the process of abrogating the structural preconditions that must be met in order to state a 
plausible claim of vertical exclusion.  Indeed, the D.C. Circuit emphasized the emergence of 
intermodal competition between cable modem and DSL providers when striking down the FCC’s 
Line Sharing Order.  The availability of broadband access from other providers meant that the 
dangers of vertical exclusion were not substantial enough to justify incurring the costs needed to 
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mandate UNE access to the high frequency portion of the loop.155  The FCC endorsed this 
conclusion in its Triennial Review Order, in which it eliminated line sharing and refused to 
mandate UNE access to the hybrid copper/fiber loops used in DLC systems.156
 The FCC drew similar conclusions in the Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services 
Order, which eliminated the Computer Inquiry rules with respect to last-mile broadband 
technologies used to provide Internet service.  As the FCC noted, the broadband market is 
characterized by vibrant intermodal competition between cable modem and DSL providers.  In 
addition, those providers faced the real prospect of entry and increased penetration by satellite, 
fixed wireless, and other alternative transmission technologies.  In the face of such competition, 
last-mile broadband providers have little to gain from engaging in vertical exclusion.  On the 
contrary, the FCC concluded that the desire to spread fixed costs over the largest revenue-base 
possible gives them powerful incentives to maximize the traffic on their networks by 
accommodating as many unaffiliated content and applications providers as possible.157
 In addition, the FCC recognized the economic consensus recognizing that vertical 
integration and vertical restraints can yield substantial efficiencies that must be taken into 
account in any vertical analysis.  As the FCC noted, regulations designed to prevent vertical 
exclusion by drawing a distinction between transmission and enhanced services was preventing 
the realization of certain technological efficiencies resulting from integrated provision of 
broadband services.  Indeed, the Computer Inquiry rules were based on the now outmoded belief 
that “because computer processing occurred at the network’s edge or outside the network, the 
major innovation would occur there too.”  The rules thus “reflect[ed] a fairly static picture of 
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network development, and an assumption that a line could be drawn between the network 
functions and computer processing without impeding technological innovation.”  Technology 
had invalidated this distinction.  Indeed, in the current environment, “[i]nnovation can occur at 
all network points and at all network layers as well as in non-network applications and 
equipment.  Continued application of the Computer Inquiry rules . . . would prevent much of this 
innovation from occurring.”158   
 The manner in which technology is in the process of increasing the competitiveness of all 
segments of the telecommunications industry and the real efficiencies from vertically integrated 
provision already identified by the FCC has effectively undercut the threat of vertical exclusion 
as a justification for regulating telecommunications networks.  Continued imposition of measures 
designed to prevent vertical exclusion thus only imposed regulatory costs, deterred innovation, 
and threatened to prevent the network from evolving toward new architectures that depend on a 
tighter integration of the network’s functionality and its transmission capabilities.  Although 
these insights suggest that vertical exclusion does not pose sufficient concern to justify imposing 
ex ante prophylactic regulation in the absence of demonstrated harm to competition, the 
theoretical literature does identify some circumstances in which vertical exclusion can plausibly 
occur.  The existence of those circumstances counsels in favor of an ex post regulatory regime in 
which access can be mandated in individual cases following a demonstration of actual economic 
harm, in much the same manner that the FCC imposed liability in Madison River.159
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D. Managed Competition 
 On occasion, regulatory authorities have intervened even when competition was possible.  
Throughout much of the late 19th and 20th centuries, regulation was often imposed to redress the 
problems caused by “ruinous,” “excessive,” or “destructive” competition.160  The concern was 
that industries characterized by high fixed costs would be plagued by excess capacity, as a surfeit 
of new entrants rushed in to invest in a new technology without anticipating the level of 
investment made by other competitors.  Once having sunk the fixed costs needed to enter, 
producing firms would not exit the industry so long as they could charge prices sufficient to 
cover their marginal costs.  The resulting competition would drive prices down to marginal cost, 
which would prevent firms from generating sufficient revenue to recover their capital 
investments.  Some sort of coordinated action, either through collusion or government 
regulation, was viewed as the only viable solution to endemic overproduction and eventual 
collapse into a natural monopoly.161
 Scholars commenting on the cable television industry have sometimes expressed concern 
about the ruinous competition that would result from “overbuilding,” which occurs when a 
second cable company enters an area already served by an incumbent and begins to compete 
with it.162  The concern was that the duplication of fixed costs would lead to higher rates.  Judge 
Posner echoed these concerns in a 1982 opinion upholding a city’s decision to issue an exclusive 
cable franchise.  Posner reasoned, “This duplication may lead not only to higher prices to cable 
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television subscribers, at least in the short run, but also to higher costs to other users of the public 
ways, who must compete with the cable television companies for access to them.  An alternative 
procedure is to pick the most efficient competitor at the outset, give him a monopoly, and extract 
from him in exchange a commitment to provide reasonable service at reasonable rates.”163   
 Ruinous competition has been heavily criticized as a basis for governmental intervention.  
For example, then-Harvard law professor and now-Justice Stephen Breyer dismissed the 
rationale as an “empty box” with no particular economic meaning or content.164  These criticisms 
have been echoed both by economists165 and by the Supreme Court.166  The reasoning is simple.  
The existence of excess capacity simply leads incumbent firms to forego making new 
investments until the market returns to long-run equilibrium.  Although producing firms might 
suffer substantial losses in the short run, the ensuing competition would yield substantial benefits 
to consumers, while simultaneously identifying the most efficient firm from among the 
contenders and providing for an empirical test of whether a particular market was in fact a 
natural monopoly.  The only justification would be to protect the investors in these companies, 
which would violate the standard admonition that regulators should protect competition, not 
competitors. 
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 Drawing on these insights, commentators have challenged claims of ruinous competition 
in cable television, arguing that overbuilding leads to lower, not higher, prices.167  However 
questionable this conclusion might have been at the time, any claims of ruinous competition have 
been undercut by the emergence of apparently sustainable intermodal competition from DBS.  
As suspect as claims of ruinous competition were with respect to cable television, they appear to 
be even less plausible with respect to broadband.  Academic studies have long indicated the 
viability of competition among multiple last-mile broadband providers.168  The FCC has 
concluded, moreover, that DSL and cable modem providers are already engaged in vigorous 
competition and that the continuing growth of the market is likely to support entry by additional 
broadband technologies.169  The large investments currently being made in 3G, WiMax, WiFi, 
broadband over power line, and other alternative broadband technologies underscore the 
widespread nature of the belief in the viability of alternative broadband platforms. 
 Even after the collapse of ruinous competition as a basis for regulation, policymakers 
have sometimes advocated a transitional form of managed competition.  The classic situation is 
when a change in technology or demand opens a market previously dominated by one player to 
competition, although such competition may take some time to emerge and the dominant player 
will continue to be able to exercise market power for quite some time.  When this occurs, 
policymakers have sometimes imposed asymmetric regulation on the dominant player either to 
prevent it from charging supracompetitive rates or from engaging in predatory actions to protect 
its market position.  Although somewhat inconsistent with the growing embrace of a policy of 
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open competition, the hope was that such asymmetric regulation would protect against 
anticompetitive excesses by the dominant firm while simultaneously nurturing the new entrants’ 
ability to survive. 
 Indeed, former FCC Chief Economist William Rogerson offered just such an argument 
when he proposed subjecting the legacy technology (DSL) to access regulation without imposing 
such regulation on the new technology (cable modem service).  Rogerson argues that DSL can be 
deployed simply by adding additional equipment to the end of the loop without making 
substantial investments in the loops themselves.  As a result, the adverse impact of DSL 
regulation on investment incentives would be minimal.  Rogerson recognizes that once 
telephone-based technologies move beyond reconditioning existing lines and begin to require 
capital investments in new facilities, mandating access would cause an unacceptable deterrence 
to investment.  The problem is even more acute with respect to cable modem service, which 
requires larger investments and upgrades to physical plant.170
 When entry by alternative network capacity is feasible, policymakers must focus on more 
than simply allocating the network that exists today.  They must also focus on the equally (if not 
more) important question of how to create incentives to invest in new network technologies that 
will comprise the optimal network of tomorrow.  In other words, they must take care not to place 
too much focus on static efficiency and pay too little attention to dynamic efficiency. 
 When competitive entry is possible, the traditional regulatory tools can have a 
detrimental impact on incentives to invest in alternative network technologies.  Consider first 
rate regulation.  So long as competitive entry remains feasible, supracompetitive returns should 
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not prove sustainable over the long run, and prices should tend toward competitive levels.  In the 
short run, however, shifts in demand, changes in technology, and other exogenous changes can 
cause markets to deviate from their long-run equilibrium position.  When that it is the case, 
prices that permit short-run supracompetitive returns allocate the scarce network resources, 
signal industry participants that the market is in short-run disequilibrium, and provides incentives 
to invest in additional network capacity.   
 The emphasis on short-run economic profits is sometimes mistakenly compared to the 
type of competition proposed by Joseph Schumpeter, in the market is dominated by a series of 
monopolists and firms compete by vying to discover the next breakthrough innovation that will 
give them a cost or quality advantage decisive enough to allow them to displace the current 
monopolist and dominate the market in its place.171  This argument ignores the key role that 
short-run supracompetitive returns play in horizontal competition within a market, in which 
multiple players offer substitute products to consumers and in which any supracompetitive 
returns will prove transient and quickly dissipated.  In fact, using regulation to prevent the 
earning of supracompetitive returns would eliminate the primary impetus for competitive entry, 
in which case the supply curve would never shift outwards in order to bring the market back into 
long-run equilibrium.172  This tendency to forestall competitive entry also implicitly presumes 
that rate regulation will persist indefinitely.  Such a surrender to the monopoly only makes sense 
if competitive entry is infeasible. 
 Mandating access to the existing network creates similar disincentives to investments in 
alternative transmission technologies.  Since any benefits gained from investments in capital or 
research must be shared with competitors, forcing a monopolist to share its resources discourages 
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incentives to improve their facilities and pursue technological innovation.  In addition, denying 
providers of complementary services guaranteed access to the existing network gives them 
powerful incentives to enter into strategic partnerships with firms interested in constructing 
alternative network capacity in competition with the existing network.  Using regulation to 
provide those same providers with guaranteed access to the existing networks would destroy any 
incentives to enter into such arrangements.  In effect, forcing a monopolist to share an input 
rescues other firms from having to supply the relevant input for themselves.  A growing body of 
empirical scholarship suggests that mandating access to last-mile broadband networks has 
deterred investment in precisely this manner.173
 This analysis underscores the extent to which debates over access to networks have all 
too often focused on the wrong policy problem.  One of the key insights of vertical integration 
theory is that markets yield efficient outcomes only if every link of the chain of production is 
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sufficiently competitive.  As a result, competition policy should focus on identifying the link that 
is the most concentrated and the most protected by entry barriers and design regulations to 
increase its competitiveness.  This implies that regulatory decisions should be guided by their 
ability to support and stimulate competition in the last mile, which remains the portion of the 
industry that is the most concentrated and the most protected by barriers to entry.  Most access 
proposals are instead intended to preserve and foster competition in markets for complementary 
services such as applications and content, which are the portions of the industry that are already 
the most competitive and sufficiently unprotected by entry barriers as to be likely to remain that 
way.  Although the promotion of competition in complementary services was arguably an 
appropriate second-order policy goal when the first-order policy goal of promoting competition 
in the last-mile was likely to prove futile, the growing feasibility of last-mile competition 
strongly supports refocusing broadband policy back onto the first-order concerns.   
 Indeed, the ensuing reductions in incentives to invest in alternative transmission 
technologies could have the unfortunate effect of cementing the existing last-mile oligopoly into 
place, which would somewhat perversely turn access regulation into the source of, rather than the 
solution to, market failure.  It is conceivable that investment disincentives could be minimized if 
policymakers engaged in asymmetric regulation that freed new entrants from rate and access 
regulation while continuing to subject the dominant player to such restrictions.  If entry is truly 
feasible, it is not entirely clear whether such regulation would be economically necessary.  In 
addition, administering such a regime would require policymakers to make difficult 
determinations about when the market became sufficiently competitive to deregulate the 
activities of the formerly dominant player.  Such a determination is likely to be particularly 
difficult in technologically dynamic industries like broadband, in which consumer demand is 
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changing rapidly and in which the prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent or to 
compete directly with the alleged bottleneck are the highest.   
 The foregoing analysis underscores the extent to which regulators seeking to impose rate 
or access regulation must thread a very narrow needle even under the best of circumstances.  
Any such intervention would only yield economic benefits if it forced prices closer to 
competitive levels.  If the regulated price is set too high, the regulatory intervention would have 
no beneficial effect.  If set too low, the intervention would deter investment while effectively 
forcing the incumbent network owner to cross subsidize providers of complementary services 
and new entrants.  And any such intervention would be completely unnecessary to the extent that 
competitive entry into last-mile transmission is feasible.  The alternative would be to allow the 
short-run supracompetitive returns to stimulate entry by alternative last-mile providers.  By the 
standards imposed under modern competition policy, the availability of three (or perhaps four) 
last-mile options should be sufficient to dissipate any concerns about anticompetitive pricing in 
the last-mile or vertical exclusion in complementary services.  It is for this reason that courts and 
policymakers have been reluctant to compel access to a resource is available from another 
source, even if it is only available at significant cost and in the relatively long run.174   
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 Although some scholars have asserted that because the dynamic efficiency gains will be 
compounded over time, they will necessarily exceed the short-run static efficiency losses,175 this 
approach seems too simplistic.  Whether the dynamic efficiency gains will dominate the static 
efficiency losses depends on the relative magnitude of the gains and losses, the speed of entry, 
and the appropriate discount rate.   
 That said, a number of institutional considerations militate in favor of the dynamic 
efficiency side of the balance.  For example, calibrating the prices needed to implement rate 
regulation and access regulation will necessarily require the government to engage in an 
exquisite exercise in line drawing that requires a careful and fact-intensive balance of opposing 
considerations.  This is made all the more complicated by the rapid pace with which the 
underlying technology and the demands that consumers are placing on the network are changing.  
The fact that regulatory processes invariably take several months to complete makes it inevitable 
that, even under the best of circumstances, rate and access regulation will be subject to a degree 
of regulatory lag.  In the worst case, as many noted commentators have observed, it can cause 
regulation to endure long after technological change has eroded its justifications.176  On the other 
hand, promoting dynamic efficiency allows regulatory authorities to focus on stimulating entry 
by new network platforms, which should represent a policy goal that is considerably easier to 
implement.  Perhaps even more importantly, promoting entry has embedded within it a built-in 
exit strategy.  Once a sufficient number of broadband network platforms exist, regulatory 
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intervention will no longer be necessary.  This stands in stark contrast with rate regulation and 
access-oriented solution, which implicitly presume that regulation will continue indefinitely. 
 It is for these reasons that managed competition has been heavily criticized.  Even the 
more limited, asymmetric approach to managed competition has been heavily criticized by 
scholars favoring both regulatory and deregulatory approaches.177  The only scenario in which 
such asymmetric regulation even arguably makes sense is if the market is already dominated by 
an incumbent that does not have to make large capital investments.  That is not the case with 
broadband, in which the market leader is a relative newcomer that must undertake extensive 
investments before it is able to provide service.  As noted earlier, even DSL, the supposed legacy 
technology, must undertake extensive investments close to those undertaken by cable modem 
providers before providing service.178  The magnitude of these capital investments is likely to 
grow still larger as local telephone companies improve their performance by deploying more 
remote terminals to further shorten the distance between end users and the DSLAMs and begin 
to deploy higher bandwidth technologies like VDSL.  The continuing importance of investment 
incentives for both DSL and cable modems undercuts the case for asymmetric regulation.  
Implementing access regimes on even a portion of the industry would also run afoul of the 
problems that have long confronted direct regulation of rates.  Even worse, asymmetric 
regulation threatens to put the government in the position of favoring one transmission 
technology over the other.   
 Such asymmetric regulation would also be inconsistent with regulatory precedent.  The 
FCC has repeated emphasized the importance of maintaining technological neutrality and of 
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regulating in a consistent manner across platforms.179  The FCC noted that it developed its 
previous asymmetric regulatory efforts, which distinguished between dominant and nondominant 
carriers, at a time when the telecommunications industry “was in the early stages of evolving 
from one ‘where service was provided largely on a monopoly basis to one where a degree of 
competition [existed] for the provision of some communications services.’”180  The FCC further 
noted: 
[T]his market environment differs markedly from the dynamic and evolving 
broadband Internet access marketplace before us today where the current market 
leaders, cable operators and wireline carriers, face competition not only from each 
other but also from other emerging broadband Internet access service providers.  
This rapidly changing market does not lend itself to conclusions about market 
dominance the commission typically makes to determine the degree of regulation 
to be applied to well-established, relatively stable telecommunications service 
markets.  On the contrary, any finding about dominance or non-dominance in this 
emerging broadband Internet access service market would be premature.181
Indeed, the FCC noted that even if it were to apply its traditional dominance/nondominance 
analysis to broadband, the fact that cable modem systems had established the early lead dictated 
that it would conclude that DSL was nondominant.182  Thus, if anything, the asymmetric 
regulation would apply to the newly emerging technology and would exempt the more 
established technology, in direct opposition to the way that asymmetric regulation is usually 
applied. 
*  *  * 
 Thus, close analysis reveals that the rationales traditionally employed to justify regulating 
local telephone networks offer little support for imposing similar regulation on last-mile 
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broadband networks.  While the invocation of regulatory precedents that have been successful in 
the past carries considerable rhetorical appeal, policymakers should subject any proposal to 
extend legacy regulation to any new technologies to close scrutiny to ensure that the underlying 
technology and economics are sufficiently similar to warrant such an extension. 
III. EVALUATING THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ACCESS TO BROADBAND NETWORKS 
 The other major omission in the debate over the regulation of last-mile broadband 
networks is the failure to incorporate a theory of network configuration.  Most of the existing 
commentary tends to discuss access to the network as a whole without analyzing the type of 
access being sought and the different ways it can affect the network.  Other commentary has 
taken the other extreme and focused too narrowly on individual network elements.  Following 
the regulatory approach taken by the FCC, the central concern of this line of commentary is 
resolving the proper way to determine the costs of the particular network elements.  This has the 
effect of treating each network element as if it existed in isolation without taking into account 
how the relationship between individual elements and the rest of the network can cause the 
impact of different types of access to vary widely.   
 Most importantly, both approaches fail to capture the fact that networks are complex 
systems whose elements interact in ways that can be sharply discontinuous and hard to predict.  
The absence of a theory of network configuration that captures the ways that network elements 
can interact with one another makes it impossible to assess how altering the costs of particular 
elements and introducing additional flows into a network can affect network design, capacity, 
and reliability.  It also prevents any realistic assessment of the impact that different types of 
access can have on transaction costs. 
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 In this Part, we analyze access through the lens of a conceptual framework that we have 
developed based on a branch of mathematics known as graph theory captures one of the key 
attributes that characterizes networks, i.e., the manner in which the whole exceeds the sum of the 
parts.  Section A begins by laying out the basic concepts of network analysis.  Section B then 
deploys the five-part system for classifying different types of access that we have developed to 
show how the various types of access to last-mile broadband networks have different affects on 
network cost, capacity, reliability, and transaction costs.   
A. Fundamental Principles in the Economics of Networks 
 Graph theory reduces networks into two types of elements.183  Nodes are points from 
which network flows begin, end, or redirected.  Nodes are connected by links.  The nodes in a 
last-mile broadband network include the servers that provide Internet applications and content, 
the host computers operated by the end users who are the ultimate consumers of applications and 
content, and the routers in the middle of the network that determine along which path particular 
traffic will flow.  The links in a last-mile broadband network are the wires (or, in the case of the 
wireless Internet, the spectrum channels) that interconnect these servers, host computers, and 
routers.  The cost, capacity, and location of each link and node can vary.   
 Depicting networks as systems of links and nodes makes it possible to analyze how to 
design network to deliver the highest levels of performance at the lowest cost.  For example, the 
architecture that connects all of the nodes in a network with the fewest links is known as a 
spanning tree.  For a network of n nodes, there exist nn–2 possible spanning trees, where n is 
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greater than or equal to two.184  Algorithms exists that make it possible to sort through all of the 
possible spanning trees to identify the minimum spanning tree, which is the network design that 
connects all of the nodes in the network at the least cost.185  In addition, network owners have 
the option of deploying higher volume server or transmission technologies if the reduction in 
variable cost and improvement in performance is large enough to justify incurring the additional 
capital expense.  Together these concepts help determine the least-cost architecture for delivering 
different amounts of network capacity.186
 Network performance is determined not only by its cost and capacity; it also depends on 
the network’s reliability, typically measured by its ability to guarantee certain minimum levels of 
bandwidth.  One of the limitations of cost-minimizing architectures like minimum spanning trees 
is that every pair of nodes is connected by a single path.  As a result, cost-minimizing 
architectures are vulnerable to congestion, since the saturation of any network element will force 
the packets into a queue.  The resulting delays will necessarily degrade network performance.  
Ensuring minimum levels of reliability becomes more difficult as the variability of the relevant 
traffic flows increases.  Network owners can increase network reliability by adding additional 
links that create cycles, which exist when more than one path exists connecting two nodes.  
Although the introduction of such redundancy increases network cost, it also promotes network 
reliability by allowing traffic to be rerouted along different paths should any particular pathway 
become congested.187
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 Analyzing networks in this manner permits network owners to choose architectures that 
deliver the levels of network capacity and reliability that customers demand at the lowest cost.  
Mandating access to the network can adversely affect each of these dimensions.  For example, 
access mandates can alter the volume and patterns of network traffic, either by introducing new 
additional traffic into the network or by diverting traffic outside the network to the point where 
the network owner no longer finds it beneficial to employ higher-volume, cost-reducing 
technologies.  In addition, certain types of access can reduce the effective capacity of particular 
network elements by occupying some of its functionality.  The net effect can alter the costs of 
operating the network as well as the network’s optimal configuration.188   
 Graph theory also shows how networks can ameliorate some of these problems.  To the 
extent that some resources are slack, the network can reroute traffic along other pathways to 
compensate for any unexpected changes in network volume or the capacity of particular network 
elements.  Redirecting traffic in this manner can increase the cost of operating the network and 
can increase congestion (and therefore degrade network performance) in those portions of the 
network through which traffic is rerouted, even in areas of the network that may be located far 
from the node from which access is sought.  Graph theory thus captures how imposing an access 
requirement can have a dramatic impact on portions of the network that are discontinuous with 
the portion of a network affected by the access requirement.  In so doing, it reflects the insight 
that networks are complex systems that can only be understood by taking into account the 
relationship between each component and the other components of the network, as well as the 
projected traffic flows. 
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 As a theoretical matter, graph theory could be used as a basis for calculating prices 
directly based on the capacity of each network element and the flows being introduced into the 
system.189  The best real-world examples of such a system are the Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs) in the electric power industry, 
which use a graph theoretical model known as locational marginal pricing to manage network 
traffic.190  For example, a leading RTO known as PJM monitors more than 1,200 electric 
generators that introduce flows into the network as well as more than 6,000 transformer 
substations through which flows exit the network.  PJM uses the information it receives to 
establish a day-ahead market, in which market participants submit offers and bids for purchasing 
electricity for each hour of the following day, as well as a real-time spot market, to compensate 
for deviations from the day-ahead forecast resulting from system changes, such as unexpected 
changes in the weather (which can affect both the demand for power as well as the carrying 
capacity of the transmission lines).191  The resulting prices can vary widely over the course of the 
day.192  As a result, RTOs and ISOs typically update their spot prices every five minutes.193
 Internet traffic is likely to be much more difficult to manage than traffic through an 
electric power grid.  As an initial matter, the Internet typically involves a much greater number 
of sources and sinks than is an electric power grid.  In addition, the burstiness of Internet traffic 
dictates that the volume function is less likely to be well behaved and that spot prices would have 
to be updated much more frequently for the Internet than for electric power.  Perhaps most 
importantly, unlike the electric grid, which is a one-way network, in the Internet different nodes 
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may constitute both sources and sinks.  Although a two-way network may be solved 
mathematically, any further increase in the dimensionality of the traffic renders the problem 
intractable.194
 To say that graph theory cannot be used to generate broadband prices is not to say that it 
might not yield valuable intuitions.  For example, graph theory can model how different types of 
access requirements can have a differential impact on transaction costs.  According to the 
Coasean theory of the firm, every entity decides whether to perform particular production 
functions internally or to contract them out based on which solution minimizes transaction 
costs.195  Access mandates disrupts the firm’s natural boundaries by forcing the network to 
externalize functions that it would otherwise perform internally.  In addition, the fact that access 
necessarily presupposes that some traffic will originate and terminate outside of the network will 
make it more difficult for the network owner to obtain the information about projected network 
flows needed to determine the optimal network design.  The fact that this information is held by 
the network owner’s competitors also raises the possibility that the party seeking access may 
attempt to use its control of that information to its strategic advantage. 
 Many of the insights of how mandating network access affects network cost, capacity, 
reliability, and transaction costs can be captured by classifying access regimes into the five 
categories depicted in Figure 1:  (1) retail access, (2) wholesale access, (3) interconnection 
access, (4) platform access, and (5) unbundled access.  Networks components owned and 
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operated by the network owned are represented as solid lines and nodes, while the portions of the 
network obtained through access requirements are depicted by dotted lines.196
Interconnection access 
(reciprocal connection of networks I and II 
I
Unbundled access
(for competitor C)
Retail access 
(final customer A)
A A
Platform access (for final 
customer A and supplier 
of complements B) 
B
A B
C
II
Wholesale access 
(wholesaler B and 
final customer A) 
 
Figure 1. The Five Forms of Access to Networks. 
 The categories vary with the type of entity (e.g., customers, competitors, or providers of 
complementary services), as well as the extent of the network to whom access is provided.  A 
close analysis of the different types of access reveals that each has a different impact on network 
cost, capacity, reliability, and transaction costs.  A better understanding of how the impact of 
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each type of access varies provides insights into the relative costs and benefits associated with 
each type of access. 
B. Applying the Framework to Last-Mile Broadband Networks 
1. Retail Access 
 Retail access represents perhaps the most common form of access imposed on 
telecommunications providers.  It provides every end user the right to benefit from the network’s 
services on the same terms and conditions as other end users.  Retail access is usually 
accompanied with direct regulation of retail rates. 
 One of retail access’s principal effects would be to limit last-mile broadband providers’ 
ability to manage their networks.  A network owner will create sufficient capacity to satisfy 
projected volume and the level of reliability that customers demand.  Because no forecast is ever 
perfect, network demand will sometimes exceed projected levels.  The best long-run solution 
would be to expand capacity to meet the increased demand.  Because broadband capacity cannot 
be expanded instantaneously, the best long-run solution may be unavailable in the short run.   
 When expanding capacity is impossible, network owners face three options:  they can 
preserve network performance by refusing to serve additional customers, they can ration existing 
network capacity by allowing prices to rise, or they can allow service to degrade (either by 
allowing the increased congestion to slow down network performance or by reducing network 
service in other ways) until demand shifts back into line with the available capacity.  Retail 
access renders the first two of these options impossible, leaving the network with no option but 
to reduce the quality of network services even when doing so would harm consumers and lead to 
inefficiencies. 
68 
 Direct regulation of rates can also be the source of significant inefficiencies.  The 
traditional formula is 
R = O + B × r 
where R is the total revenue that the telephone company is allowed to generate, O is the 
operating expense, B is the depreciated capital investment in the network (also known as the rate 
base), and r is the risk-adjusted cost of capital (also known as the rate of return).  Individual rates 
are determined by dividing the revenue requirement by the expected volume. 
 Regulatory authorities have long struggled over whether the rate base should be 
calculated based on historical cost or replacement cost.197  This task becomes all the more 
complicated if regulators base the cost calculation not the structure of the actual network, but 
rather on the structure of a hypothetical network configured according to the best available 
technology.  Cost-plus rate setting regimes also fail to provide incentives for network owners to 
economize and, to the extent that they only allow rates of return to be earned on the rate base, 
can introduce a bias toward capital intensive solutions.198  Experience with cable television has 
revealed the difficulties of regulating retail rates when the quality of the product being regulated 
varies,199 as will be the case with respect to broadband.  
 The implementation of rate regulation also harms the competitive process in other ways.  
The process of developing and filing tariffs and shepherding them through any challenges that 
arise during the regulatory approval process necessarily increases transaction costs and causes 
delay.  Furthermore, by forcing advance disclosure of rates, retail access forces all firms to give 
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their competitors advance notice of any changes in business strategies.  In addition, rate 
regulation facilitates collusion by making information about price more transparent, by making 
products more homogeneous, and by providing for a mechanism for enforcing any deviations 
from the established price.  The enforced uniformity inherent in retail access also reduces 
network owners’ ability to tailor product offering to individual customers’ particular needs.  
Furthermore, it has long been understood that deadweight loss can be minimized in high fixed 
cost industries by allocating greater proportions of those fixed costs to those customers that are 
least price sensitive (and thus will reduce their consumption the least in response to pricing 
above marginal cost).200  The nondiscrimination aspects of retail access foreclose such welfare 
enhancing possibilities. 
 Perhaps most importantly, retail access can dampen incentives to invest in last-mile 
broadband technologies.  As noted earlier, regulators must thus thread a very narrow needle if 
retail access is to have any beneficial effect.201  Prices that are set too high will have no effect.  
Prices that are set too low will reduce incentives for incumbents and competitors alike to invest 
in upgrading existing networks and to investment in last-mile technologies.  Establishing rates 
that mimic the market-based pricing would be difficult under the best of circumstances.  It 
borders on the impossible with respect to technologies that are undergoing rapid innovation and 
differentiation and that are growing ever more complex. 
 Most importantly, the presence of intermodal competition largely obviates the need for 
regulatory authorities to assume the burdens of implementing retail access.  It is for this reason 
that commentators have generally opposed mandating retail access to last-mile broadband 
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networks.202  Indeed, it does not appear that the FCC has ever attempted to mandate retail access 
to last-mile broadband services.  Nor does it appear that state or local authorities have attempted 
to do so.  Indeed, even when attempting to impose other types of access mandates, state 
authorities affirmatively disclaimed any attempt to regulate the reasonableness of retail rates.203
2. Wholesale Access 
 Wholesale access is a right given to a network owner’s competitors to purchase services 
normally sold by the network at retail and resell them to end users.  The FCC initially imposed 
wholesale access on DSL.  For example, the Computer Inquiries required incumbent local 
telephone companies offering enhanced services to make the transmission component of its 
offering available to unaffiliated enhanced service providers on a tariffed basis.204  Furthermore, 
the Advanced Services Second Report and Order ruled that the resale requirements of the 1996 
Act applied to DSL services offered to end users regardless of whether DSL was classified as 
telephone exchange service or exchange access.  This in essence authorized competitors to lease 
DSL service from the incumbent local telephone company at their retail rate less the costs of 
marketing, provisioning, billing, and customer service usually incurred by the incumbent, but 
avoided when service is provided through a reseller.205  Wholesale access was also available 
through special access tariffs of the type approved by the FCC with respect to GTE.206
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 The FCC’s Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order abolished both sets of 
wholesale access requirements.  As an initial matter, the conclusion that DSL and other forms of 
wireline broadband represented information services and not telecommunications services 
rendered the 1996 Act wholly inapplicable.  At the same time, the FCC also exempted DSL and 
other wireline broadband technologies used for Internet access from the access requirements 
imposed by the Computer Inquiries.207
 The situation is quite different with respect to cable.  As the FCC has noted, “cable 
operators . . . have never been required to make Internet access transmission available to third 
parties on a wholesale basis.”208  As noted earlier, the FCC took somewhat inconsistent positions 
during its merger reviews, acceding to requests to mandate multiple ISP access during the 
America Online-Time Warner merger, while rejecting calls to give unaffiliated ISPs wholesale 
access to cable modem systems when approving the AT&T-TCI, AT&T-MediaOne, Comcast-
AT&T and Adelphia transactions.209  The agency addressed the issue more definitively in its 
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, when it refused to mandate wholesale access to cable modem 
systems.210
 The FCC’s reluctance to mandate wholesale access to last-mile broadband systems is 
understandable.  Because total demand under wholesale access depends not only on the retail 
price, but also on the price of wholesale access, its net impact on network demand is ambiguous.  
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The resulting increase or decrease in traffic can adversely affect network cost, capacity, and 
reliability.  Forcing networks to externalize marketing, provisioning, and billing functions also 
forces networks to deviate from the transaction cost minimizing institutional structure that 
represents the natural boundaries of the firm.   
 Indeed, last-mile broadband providers already face powerful incentives to provide 
wholesale access.  As the FCC noted, the benefits from spreading fixed costs over a larger 
customer base give network owners a strong motivation to offer wholesale access voluntarily.  
Indeed, all of the major wireline broadband providers negotiate private wholesale access 
contracts on a regular basis and have indicated their intention to continue doing so in the future.  
Competitive forces already operating in the broadband market thus alleviated any need for the 
FCC to compel wholesale access or to oversee the terms under which wholesale access occurs.211
 In addition, wholesale access hurts dynamic efficiency by eliminating demand from 
complementary service providers who represent the natural strategic partners for those seeking to 
construct alternative network capacity.  The FCC noted in its Wireline Broadband Internet 
Access Services Order, “Because our rules require a particular type of generalized wholesale 
offering, they may reduce incentives for ISPs to seek alternative arrangements from other 
broadband Internet access platform providers and for those other providers to offer such 
arrangements.”  The greater flexibility and reduction in risk stemming from eliminating 
wholesale access also increases incentives for existing players to invest in upgrading their 
networks.212
 Perhaps most problematic is the fact that the type of competition induced by wholesale 
access provides few consumer benefits.  Under wholesale access, all of the competing ISPs 
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employ the same equipment and thus provide the same speed, services, and access to content.  
Resellers thus cannot compete in terms of cost, network features, or quality of service 
impossible.  Instead, the only way in which they can compete is through their willingness to 
accept thinner margins.213   
 It is for this reason that most commentators have found little value in the type of 
competition induced by wholesale access.214  The paucity of consumer benefits underscores the 
extent to which wholesale access represents something of a competition policy anomaly.  When 
confronted with an excessively concentrated market, competition policy’s traditional response is 
to deconcentrate the problematic market, either by breaking up the existing monopoly or by 
facilitating entry by a competitor.  Wholesale access, in contrast, leaves the concentrated market 
intact and instead simply requires that the bottleneck resource be shared.  Such an approach may 
be justified if competition is infeasible, as was the case when wholesale access to last-mile 
broadband networks was first mandated.  As the FCC noted, the emergence of competition from 
alternative broadband technologies essentially renders wholesale access untenable.215  The 
limited benefits can no longer offset the significant costs and the adverse impact on the 
incentives to invest in new network capacity. 
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3. Interconnection Access 
 Interconnection access refers to reciprocal connections between two networks competing 
to offer similar services to the same customers as the network owner.  It gives each provider the 
right to handoff traffic originating on its own network for termination on the other provider’s 
network.  It also obligates the provider to terminate traffic originating on the competitor’s 
network.  These mandated reciprocal connections combine the two smaller networks to form a 
larger network. 
 Interconnection access is considerably more disruptive to network management than 
retail or wholesale access.  As was the case with wholesale access, the net impact of 
interconnection access on network demand is ambiguous, although for a very different reason.  
Increasing the number of subscribers increases the value of the network, which in turn can cause 
network demand to increase.  At the same time, interconnection access necessarily presumes that 
some network traffic will originate and terminate on other networks.  The resulting diversion of 
network traffic places downward pressure on network demand.  The overall impact of 
interconnection on network demand depends on which of these two effects dominates.   
 The resulting change in network demand in turn affects the optimal network 
configuration.  As noted earlier, network owners use forecasts of the magnitude, distribution, and 
variability of demand to design their networks so as to minimize cost, maximize capacity, and 
optimize reliability.  In the process, the network owner must decide where to place its links and 
nodes and whether it can aggregate sufficient volume to justify making capital expenditures in 
cost-reducing transmission technologies.  Regardless of whether interconnection access increases 
or decreases demand, any unanticipated deviations in the level of network traffic alters the 
optimal network configuration, which in turn affects network cost and performance.   
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 Interconnection access also affects network design in other ways.  Unlike retail and 
wholesale access, which only introduces traffic at locations where the network already serves 
customers, interconnection access requires networks to accept traffic at locations where the 
network was not previously offering service, although those interfaces are likely to be at major 
nodes.  Interconnection access thus requires network owners to develop systems to provision and 
meter usage at new points within its network.  Introducing new flows in the middle of the 
network also can be more difficult to manage than flows introduced at traditional customer 
locations.  In addition, interconnection access increases transaction costs by forcing network 
owners to obtain the information they need to make these decisions from their competitors rather 
than through direct observation.   
 The architecture of the Internet is such that last-mile providers generally do not 
interconnect with one another directly.  Instead, DSL and cable modem providers serving the 
same area typically interconnect indirectly through the Internet backbone.  This greatly 
minimizes many of the problems traditionally associated with interconnection access.  Scholars 
concerned about promoting interconnection access have nonetheless raised the concern that 
backbone providers might strategically engage in discriminatory interconnection or refuse to 
interconnect altogether in ways that are privately beneficial, but economically harmful.216
 As a recent working paper issued by the FCC Office of Plans and Policy notes, a wide 
variety of legitimate reasons exist for refusing to interconnect with all other backbones in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.  For example, peering between a backbone with a national presence 
on both coasts and a regional backbone with a presence on only one coast would allow the 
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regional backbone to free ride on the national backbone’s infrastructure investments.  
Asymmetries in the size of the traffic being conveyed can lead to similar problems.217
 As noted earlier, network economic effects subject network providers to powerful 
incentives to interconnect with one another.218  In addition, market structure plays a critical role 
in determining the competitive impact of a refusal to interconnect.  Specifically, the models in 
the refusal to interconnect to harms competition assume the existence of a dominant player.  The 
backbone market has historically been comprised of five players of roughly equal size.219  When 
the market is structured in this manner, refusals to interconnect cannot plausibly lead to 
anticompetitive harms, since the demand-side economies of scale created by network economic 
effects would place any network that refused to interconnect at a decisive competitive 
disadvantage.220   
 It is for this reason that the FCC has traditionally declined to mandate interconnection 
access among backbone providers.  As the agency noted in its 2001 Intercarrier Compensation 
NPRM, “The backbones appear to be successfully negotiating interconnection agreements among 
themselves without any regulatory intervention, and we see no reason to intervene in this 
efficiently functioning market.”221  The FCC followed similar reasoning in its orders clearing the 
Verizon-MCI, SBC-AT&T, and AT&T-BellSouth mergers, ruling that competition among five 
backbone providers of roughly equal size was sufficient to obviate the need to mandate 
                                                 
217 See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake:  Connecting Internet Backbones 18-20 (Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n Off. of Plans & Pol’y Working Paper No. 32, Sept. 2000), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp32.pdf 
218 See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text. 
219 Kende, supra note 217, at 7. 
220 Faulhaber, Bottlenecks and Bandwagons, supra note 121, at 501-02; Economides, supra note 121, at 390 
(recognizing that network economic effects give firms strong incentives to interconnect); Katz & Shapiro, supra 
note 121, at 429 (noting that “[a]s the number of firms becomes increasingly large,” equilibrium in which all firms 
interconnect converges to perfectly competitive equilibrium). 
221 Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 
9610, 9656 ¶ 127 (2001). 
77 
interconnection access.222  Conversely, in approving the WorldCom-MCI merger, the FCC 
raised the concern that the merger would give one company a sufficiently dominant market share 
to allow it to harm competition.  As a result, the FCC conditioned its approval of the merger on 
the divestiture of MCI’s backbone assets.  Once those assets had been spun off, the agency saw 
no reason to mandate interconnection access.  The spinoff of MCI’s backbone business ensured 
that the backbone market would remain sufficiently competitive to obviate the need for any 
direct regulation of interconnection.223
 Competition among backbone providers has thus been sufficient to obviate any need to 
mandate interconnection access among broadband providers.  Any move toward concentration in 
the backbone market is better solved through taking steps to ensure the market remains 
unconcentrated than by mandating interconnection access in the last-mile.  
4. Platform Access 
 Platform access occurs when the government creates a standard and requires networks to 
provide nondiscriminatory service to anyone presenting data configured in accordance with that 
standard.  The FCC has mandated platform access to last-mile broadband networks as part of its 
Computer Inquiries, in which it required the leading local telephone companies to “make 
available standardized hardware and software interfaces that are able to support transmission, 
switching, and signaling functions identical to those utilized in the enhanced service provided by 
the carrier.”  The Computer Inquiries also required the major local telephone companies to offer 
tariffs providing for nondiscriminatory access to the network to any firm presenting its data 
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configured in accordance with that standardized interface.224  Many industry players and public 
interest groups are advocating imposing platform access to broadband networks through the 
cluster of policy proposals that fall under the banner of network neutrality. 
 By increasing the availability of complementary goods, platform access typically causes 
network demand to increase, which in turn affects the network’s optimal configuration, capacity, 
and reliability.  As noted earlier, the normal way for network owners to protect network 
performance should network demand exceed expectations is to deny service to new customers.  
As is the case with respect to other forms of access, mandating platform access forecloses this 
option and forces the network either to permit network performance to degrade or to maintain 
excess capacity as insurance against this possibility.  Either solution necessarily raises costs 
and/or reduces consumer benefits. 
 The inability to deny service to any complementary service provider becomes particularly 
troublesome once one acknowledges how sensitive network performance is to the magnitude and 
variability of demand.  The introduction of particular traffic affects the network in nonuniform 
ways.  Not only can it cause local congestion in the areas near where the traffic enters the 
network.  As noted earlier, networks’ ability to route traffic along other paths can cause the 
introduction of traffic in one location to impair performance in portions of the network that are 
located far from where the additional traffic is introduced.  The impact on network performance 
thus depends not only on the magnitude and variability of the flows being introduced into the 
network through platform access.  It also depends on the configuration of the entire network, 
including the arrangement of elements in areas of the network quite distant from the access point, 
as well as the magnitude and the variability of the flows being introduced into the network by 
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other parties.  The greater the variability of the flows, the bigger the adverse impact on network 
performance. 
 These qualities make platform access to last-mile broadband networks particularly 
problematic.  Internet traffic is notoriously “bursty,” in that it often involves the brief 
introduction of a high volume of traffic followed by an extended period of little or no traffic.  
This is particularly true for certain types of applications and contrasts sharply with the flows in 
other types of networks, in which flows tend to be steadier and tend to change more gradually.  
The classic response to these problems is for the network owner to exercise discretion in the 
types of application and content providers it allows to access the network as well as the precise 
locations at which it permits such access to occur.  Platform access prevents them from 
exercising such discretion. 
 The implementation of platform access necessarily gives rise to other economic harms.  
For example, platform access presumes that network owners must provide access to any content 
or application provider that presents data in a standard format.  In the extreme case, the 
government requires all networks to conform to that standard and prohibits networks from 
deviating from it.  Although the standardization of the Internet architecture is often praised as an 
unmitigated good, conventional economic theory underscores the existence of an optimal level of 
standardization, determined by the tradeoff between the value of larger network size created by 
network economic effects and the value that end users place on the different types of services.  If 
consumer preferences are relatively homogeneous, one would expect the entire network to 
coalesce around a single standard.  As consumer preferences become increasingly 
heterogeneous, one would expect the optimal number of networks to begin to exceed one.  By 
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artificially limiting the level of nonstandardization, platform access can prevent the network 
from reaching the optimal level of standardization. 
 Platform access is also subject to a number of practical problems.  Once the government 
designates a standard, network owners cannot implement any changes to that standard until those 
changes have been approved by the government.  Imposing platform access thus inevitably 
causes a degree of delay in the speed with which the network can adapt to changes in technology.  
In addition, platform access requires the government to designate particular locations within the 
network where platform access can occur.  The logical course of action is for the government to 
choose locations at natural interfaces between different segments of the industry.  The problem is 
that technological change can cause natural interfaces to shift or to collapse altogether.  Such 
problems are likely to loom particularly large in industries like broadband which are undergoing 
rapid technological change. 
 Consider the transformation that occurred when end users shift from narrowband, in 
which end users reach through dial-up services, to broadband connections such as DSL or cable 
modem service.  Long-haul transmission is provided by backbones, which provide high-speed 
connections among a dozen or so network access points located at key locations throughout the 
country.  Under a narrowband architecture, end users connect to the Internet through their local 
telephone system, which routed Internet-bound calls to locations in individual cities spread 
throughout the country in the same manner that it routed conventional telephone calls.  The local 
telephone company did not need to maintain any packet-switching capability of its own.  The 
only difference between Internet-bound calls and conventional calls was that the former 
consisted of data packets encoded in an analog format by the dial-up modem and the latter 
consisted voice traffic.  With respect to either, the local telephone company simply served as a 
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pass through.  The key function served by ISPs was to convert the analog signal into a digital 
signal and to provide the connection between the modem banks dispersed in communities 
throughout the country and the limited number of network access points served by the 
backbones.  ISPs perform a number of other functions, including supplying e-mail servers, 
hosting end users’ webpages, offering proprietary content, and caching the popular content 
locally so that customers can access it more easily. 
 The arrival of broadband technologies has effected some fundamental changes in the 
Internet’s architecture.  Because both DSL and cable modem providers use the same 
infrastructure to provide two different types of service (either cable television combined with 
cable modem service or local telephone service combined with DSL), both must maintain 
equipment to segregate the two different communication streams.  Unlike what was the case in 
the narrowband world, last-mile broadband providers must maintain a packet-switched network 
in their main facilities to hold and route the stream of data packets after they have been separated 
from other types of communications.  Once broadband networks were required to maintain their 
own data networks, it was a relatively simple matter for them to displace the ISP and instead 
negotiate their own interconnection agreement with a backbone provider.  Indeed, given that last-
mile providers already had to perform most of the functions previously provided by ISPs, in 
many cases it would likely be more efficient to have the last-mile provider carry out the 
functions previously performed by the unaffiliated ISP.   
 The efficiency of having last-mile providers perform the functions previously performed 
by ISPs is demonstrated dramatically by the manner in which the multiple ISP access mandated 
during the AOL-Time Warner merger has been implemented.  Contrary to the original 
expectations of the FTC, the unaffiliated ISPs that have obtained access to AOL-Time Warner’s 
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cable modem systems under the FTC’s merger clearance order have not placed their own packet 
networks and backbone access facilities within AOL-Time Warner’s headends.  Instead, traffic 
bound for these unaffiliated ISPs exits the headend via AOL-Time Warner’s backbone and is 
handed off to the unaffiliated ISP at some external location.  It is hard to see how consumers 
benefit from such arrangements, given that they necessarily use the same equipment and thus 
provide the same speed, services, and access to content regardless of the identity of their nominal 
ISP.  The fact that these unaffiliated ISPs have found it more economical to share AOL Time 
Warner’s existing ISP facilities rather than build their own strongly suggests that integrating ISP 
and last-mile operations is more efficient.   
 In other words, the technological structure of the narrowband made the interface between 
local telephone systems and ISPs a natural boundary between two different providers.  The 
architectural changes wrought by the digitization of last-mile broadband technologies caused 
what was once a natural interface between market players point to collapse.  By requiring 
network owners to maintain standardized interfaces, platform access runs the risk of locking 
existing interfaces into place long after technological changes have rendered such an interface 
obsolete. 
 Platform access can also increase transaction costs.  Government establishment of a 
standardized interface requires considerable time and effort both by regulatory authorities and by 
interested parties participating in the process.  To the extent that the standard developed by the 
government differs from the current network architecture, last-mile broadband providers will 
also have to incur the costs needed to reconfigure their equipment to make it compatible with the 
standard.  In addition, because a network owner can render a platform access mandate a nullity 
simply by charging excessive prices to providers of complementary services with which it does 
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not wish to do business, platform access necessarily envisions some oversight and enforcement 
of the nondiscrimination.  The complexity of the interface means that the means for potential 
discrimination are likely to be myriad, which in turn means that regulatory authorities are likely 
to have to oversee an extremely large proportion of the dimensions of the business relationship. 
 Imposing platform access can also adversely affect dynamic efficiency.  By guaranteeing 
content and applications providers access to the existing network, platform access deprives new 
entrants seeking to construct alternative last-mile platforms of their natural strategic partners. 
 Despite the seriousness of the costs of mandating platform access, it is still conceivable 
that such regulation might create sufficient benefits to justify its imposition.  The problem with 
this argument is that last-mile broadband providers already possess powerful incentives to open 
their networks to a wide range of content and applications providers.  The likelihood that the 
goals of platform access will be accomplished even in the absence of government intervention 
undercuts the case for imposing it as a regulatory mandate. 
 The FCC embraced much of this reasoning in its Wireline Broadband Internet Access 
Services Order.  The FCC noted how platform access can adversely affect network architecture.  
The imposition of a standardized interface can create equipment configuration costs.  Forcing 
network owners to reengineer general use equipment to conform to the standard requires the 
network owner to confront the unattractive choice between either foregoing the benefits of the 
equipment’s full functionality or deferring deployment until the equipment is reengineered to be 
compatible with the standard.  In addition, consumer demand and technological improvements 
were pushing the industry “toward equipment that integrates information service and 
transmission capabilities in a manner that allows functions to be performed at multiple points 
within a broadband network and closer to the end user than ever before.”  The FCC warned that 
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its “rules should not force technological development in another, less efficient direction” by 
insisting on the separation of functionality and transmission that platform access presumes.225
 Platform access also impedes the network’s ability to evolve to meet the needs of the 
increasingly heterogeneous demands of end users.  As the FCC noted, standardization hinders 
network owners’ ability to respond to individual requests for new or modified features.  Refusing 
to impose platform access would allows for more technological innovation than “‘cookie-cutter’ 
common carrier offerings” implicit in any nondiscriminatory access mandate.226   
 Indeed, the FCC noted that the Computer Inquiries reflected “a fairly static picture of 
network development” in which innovation occurred at the network’s edge or outside the 
network altogether and in which “a line could be drawn between the network functions and 
computer processing without impeding technological innovation.”  Policy should adapt to reflect 
the insight that “innovation can occur at all network points and at all network layers as well as in 
non-network applications and equipment.”227   
 The FCC also expressed concern about how platform access increases transaction costs.  
As an initial matter, the agency took seriously concerns expressed about “the inherent regulatory 
delay that occurs through the network change disclosure process, the web positing requirements, 
and tariffing requirements” as well as the costs of determining the proper regulatory 
classification under the Computer Inquiry regimes as well as the steps needed to comply with 
those restrictions.228   
 In addition, the FCC noted how platform access “deter[s] broadband infrastructure 
investment by creating disincentives to the deployment of facilities capable of providing 
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invocative broadband Internet access services.”  The FCC found “this negative impact on 
deployment and innovation particularly troubling in view of Congress’ clear and express policy 
goal of ensuing broadband deployment, and its directive that we remove barriers to that 
deployment.”  Giving network owners greater flexibility in their dealings with providers of 
complementary services will allow them to “take more risks in investing in and deploying new 
technologies.”229  In addition, the fact that network owners are already confronted with powerful 
incentives to make transmission capacity available to providers of complementary services 
absent regulation cut against the need for imposing platform access.  Indeed, such incentives are 
likely to become even stronger as content and applications providers develop and deploy VoIP 
and other innovative broadband service offerings.230
5. Unbundled Access 
 Unbundled access is a right given to competitors to individual components of the 
incumbent’s network.  Cable modem systems have never been subject to unbundled access 
requirements.  As we described above, the FCC initially subjected DSL systems to limited 
unbundling requirements, but has eliminated most of those requirements over time. 
 Unbundled access disrupts network management to a greater degree than any other form 
of access.  Unbundled access simultaneously supports complementary services, which tends to 
increase network demand, while diverting some traffic outside of the network, which tends to 
reduce network demand.  As a result, its net impact on the demand for network resources is 
ambiguous.  Network owners depend on forecasts of demand when deciding on the configuration 
that provides the greatest capacity and the optimal level of reliability at the lowest cost.  The 
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ambiguous impact of unbundled access on network demand makes such forecasts considerably 
more uncertain.  The mandatory carriage aspect of unbundled access also prevents the network 
owner from protecting network performance by responding to any unexpected increases in 
demand by refusing carry additional traffic. 
 Unlike other forms of access, unbundled access has the potential to introduce flows deep 
in the heart of the network at points that may not represent natural points of interface with other 
providers.  As a result, the pattern of flows associated with unbundled access often bears little 
resemblance to the pattern of flows for which the network was designed.  In addition, tying up 
isolated elements of the network can cause network performance to degrade in ways that are 
often quite unexpected.  Not only can it increase congestion in the portion of the network 
adjacent to the elements to which network access is sought.  As our discussion of the max-
flow/min-cut theorem illustrates, the fact that networks attempt to minimize such distortions by 
rerouting traffic through other portions of the network means that unbundled access can create 
new bottlenecks in areas of the network that are located far from the elements to which 
competitors obtain unbundled access.  Thus unbundled access can adversely affect network 
performance in ways that are sharply discontinuous and unpredictable. 
 Unbundled access can also greatly increase the transaction costs of network management.  
At a minimum, placing some of the traffic outside of the network prevents the network owner 
from observing the information regarding the magnitude and variability of network traffic 
directly.  Instead, such information is only available from the network’s competitors, who are 
likely to be under no regulatory obligation to share that information and may have strategic 
incentives to withhold it.  In addition, unbundled access forces network owners to develop new 
processes and equipment for provisioning and metering access at just about any points within its 
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network even if it has never provided service at those points in the past and has no plans to do so 
in the future.  
 In addition, unbundled access can have a devastating impact on incentives to invest in 
alternative network capacity.  Giving competitors the right to access elements of the existing 
network at cost effectively destroys their incentive to invest in third-generation wireless 
networks and other broadband technologies, particularly if the network owner is not allowed to 
charge its actual cost and is instead required to charge the cost of a hypothetical network 
providing the same service using the most efficient technology currently available.  Requiring 
that any successful improvements to the existing networks be shared also substantially dampens 
incumbents’ incentives to invest in upgrading their own networks.   
 This is particularly true when the success of various improvements is highly variable and 
hard to anticipate.  Consider, for example, an incumbent that is considering whether to upgrade 
its network in a way that is likely to be successful in some geographic areas, but not in others in 
ways that are unpredictable.  Absent unbundled access, the network owner could forego 
determining in which geographies the innovation the innovation was likely to prove successful 
and instead focus on the average success rate across all geographies and undertake the 
investment as long as that average success rate exceeds its investment hurdle.  The situations 
changes dramatically once unbundled access is imposed.  Unbundled access gives competitors 
the opportunity to obtain access to only those geographies that prove economically successful 
and to ignore those that do not.  This leaves the network owner with two relatively unattractive 
possibilities.  First, it can spend additional resources to determine in advance which geographies 
are likely to prove more successful.  Even if it is successful in making this determination, 
unbundled access guarantees that any economic benefits it obtains from these investments will 
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be quickly dissipated.  Second, it can forego the investment altogether.  Either decision will have 
an adverse impact on network investment. 
 Justice Breyer invoked these considerations with respect to narrowband technologies in 
his separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board: 
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s incentive to keep up 
or to improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of value-creating 
investment, research, or labor. . . . [One cannot] guarantee that firms will 
undertake the investment necessary to produce complex technological innovations 
knowing that any competitive advantage deriving from those innovations will be 
dissipated by the sharing requirement.231  
 A majority of the Court echoed the same concerns in Trinko.  The Court noted, 
“Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage . . . may lessen the incentive for 
the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.”232  
Furthermore, the Court recognized how unbundled access requires undertaking the difficult task 
of “identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing,” a task made all the more 
difficult by the fact that disputes over access to telecommunications networks “are highly 
technical” and “likely to be extremely numerous, given the incessant, complex, and constantly 
changing interaction of competitive and incumbent LECs implementing the sharing and 
interconnection obligations.”233   
 The D.C. Circuit extended this reasoning to last-mile broadband networks when striking 
down the FCC’s Line Sharing Order.  The court noted that “mandatory unbundling comes at a 
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cost, including disincentives to research and development by both ILECs and CLECs and the 
tangled management inherent in shared use of a common resource.”  In addition, the existence of 
intermodal competition from cable modem providers eliminated the need to impose unbundled 
access.234
 The FCC relied on many of these same insights in its Triennial Review Order, which 
eliminated UNE access to the high frequency portion of the loop, fiber loops, and packet 
switching equipment.  Extending unbundled access to last-mile broadband networks “would 
blunt the deployment of advanced telecommunications infrastructure by incumbent LECs and the 
incentive for competitive LECs to invest in their own facilities.”235  The FCC repeatedly 
acknowledged that the market for last-mile broadband services had grown increasingly 
competitive.236  Competition is better than unbundling because of the difficulties in allocating 
shared costs and resources.237
*  *  * 
 A more sophisticated understanding of the interactions between various network elements 
thus provides a basis for identifying and categorizing the various types of access and sheds new 
light on the differential impact that each type of access has on network cost, capacity, reliability, 
and transaction costs.  Indeed, our analysis underscores how the lack of a theory of network 
configuration has limited the insight provided previous analyses and raises serious doubts about 
whether mandating any of these forms of access would represent good policy.   
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CONCLUSION 
 The emergence of last-mile broadband networks over the past decade has been 
accompanied by calls for mandating access those networks.  The persistence with which calls for 
access have arisen and the fervor with which they are advanced makes it unlikely that this issue 
is going to fade any time in the foreseeable future. 
 The existing debate has overlooked key differences in the technological and economic 
environment that characterize the transition from narrowband and broadband.  The digitization of 
network traffic has allowed a vibrant intermodal competition to emerge that undercuts the 
rationales traditionally invoked to justify regulating previous telecommunications networks.  In 
addition, the magnitude of the capital investments required by the deployment of broadband has 
placed renewed emphasis on the need to preserve investment incentives and the importance of 
promoting dynamic efficiency.  Together, these insights strongly indicate the inappropriateness 
of bringing broadband within the ambit of regulatory regimes previously developed to govern 
narrowband communications. 
 In addition, previous analyses have failed to incorporate any theory of network 
configuration that reflects the interactions between different components that cause networks to 
behave in unpredictable ways.  Using graph theory to model networks captures the extent to 
which networks constitute complex systems that can only be understood in light of precise 
manner in which the various network elements are configured, as well as the magnitude and the 
variability of the traffic flowing through the network at any given time.  In addition, this 
analytical framework allows us to identify five different types of access—retail access, 
wholesale access, interconnection access, platform access, and unbundled access—and to assess 
how each type affects network performance.  Although the precise impact of each type of access 
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varies, the strength of intermodal competition, the importance of preserving incentives, and the 
adverse impact that each type of access has on network management provide powerful reasons 
against mandating any of these types access to last-mile broadband networks. 
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